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I. INTRODUCTION
New legal institutions can quickly take root and exert an impact
on an economy and on attitudes about an economy, even in the pres-
ence of culturally embedded norms and stereotypes that are hostile to
such institutions. More specifically, in a context of rapid change, con-
tract enforcing courts help open up the local marketplace and foster
competition by reducing the risk and costs of transactions outside of
collusive' arrangements. So the experience of Shanghai would teach
US.
The relationship between law and economic institutions has been
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Yale University, Ph.D., 1990;
Yale University, J.D., M.Phil, M.A., 1989; Stanford University, A.M., 1985. The author
would like to thank the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, the Columbia
Law School Committee on Legal Education Exchange with China, and the Yale Law School
Center for Studies in Law, Economics and Public Policy for their generous financial support
during the research and writing phases of this study.
All translations of Chinese sources have been performed by the author.
1. I do not use "collusive" in its pejorative sense, but rather in a neutral sense, to denote a
cooperative network of long-term business relationships such as those found in guilds.
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the subject of an exciting wave of inquiry in microeconomics, contract
theory, and corporations law.2 This growing body of theory invites
empirical verification.3 In writing this article, I hope that a case study
of the relationship between courts and markets will be useful to those
seeking to amplify and test these theories.4
Shanghai in the century before the communist revolution of 1949
is a rich source of information on the role of courts in local markets.
Nicknamed "the cit[y] of sin,"5 Shanghai was famous the world over
for its chaos. It presents an extreme example of the challenge legal
institutions faced in an economic environment in a state of flux. The
local economy was in rapid transition out of an agricultural-based
trading economy, servicing the interior of China, into an industrial-
ized economy linked to international markets. Shanghai also provides
an example of creative legal experimentation to meet the challenge of
2. Among the seminal works are Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
386 (1937); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985).
These works spawned more detailed studies on the relationship between legal regulation and
economic institutions, principally a relationship of self-regulation of corporations as an
efficient alternative to contracting. A notable example is Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate
Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). Studies that
focus on commercial relationships in the absence of legal regulation, principally self-enforcing
contracts, include Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON.
& ORGANIZATION 5 (1985); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing
Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using
Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983).
3. The theorists themselves have encouraged empirical studies. Prominent among them
is Oliver Williamson. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 393-98. Two recent studies on the
nature of contractual arrangements in a risky economic environment explore the phenomenon
of homogeneous middlemen groups. Drawing their data from traditional Chinese merchant
communities in Southeast Asia, areas lacking a law of contract, the studies identify self-help
mechanisms that allowed traders to "cop[e] with contract uncertainty." Janet T. Landa, A
Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to
Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 349-50 (1981) (emphasis omitted). The mechanisms
involved a "personaliz[ation] or particulariz[ation]" of "exchange relations." Id. at 350. See
also Sumner S. La Croix, Homogeneous Middleman Groups: What Determines the
Homogeneity?, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 211 (1989).
4. The notion running through this article, that the availability of courts for dispute
resolution allows merchants to plan in advance for the salvage of profits after the breakdown of
a contractual relationship is different from the "post contractual opportunistic behavior"
described by Klein, Crawford and Alchian in their article Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. LAW & EcON. 297 (1978). They describe
a set of conditions that enhances the risk of breakdown of a contractual relationship. They call
this set of conditions "the presence of appropriable specialized quasi-rents" arising out of
assets that are specific. I do not believe that the conditions they identify necessarily prejudice
future contracting while litigation does prejudice future contracting. The breakdown they
discuss also is an effort to increase profits beyond original contracted expectations, whereas the
post-breakdown salvage I discuss refers to opportunities to salvage some of the profits from a
reneged promise, opportunities anticipated before the contract breach.
5. HENDRIK DELEEUW, CITIES OF SIN (1979).
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a risky economic environment. Centralized authority dissolved and
ancient political taboos against mixing law and commerce lost hold.
In their place came freedom to choose. Local autonomy imbued
Shanghai residents with a heady sense of possibility and a willingness
to experiment. In response to the new freedom, several different polit-
ical authorities founded thirty-three civil courts in Shanghai within
seventy years.
Another advantage of Shanghai in the study of the relationship
between legal and economic processes is that Shanghai's legal and
economic experimentation grew out of a context far removed from
our own. Prominent legal theorists here have called for the incorpo-
ration, somehow, of culture into the analysis of law and economics, if
not to break down the universality of economic and legal theories, so
to give more substantial support to their universality.6 If anything
might tap cultural issues for us, it is China. Culture draws our atten-
tion at every turn when we view a society as different from ours as
China. If our theories hold for China, they must hold even more cer-
tainly at home.7 As a city open to experiment and change in this
century, Shanghai also allows us to consider the transformative effect
of law on culture and to consider an economic culture shaped by a
different experience with economic stability and chaos.
The idea of law as a means to bring order to commerce was alien
to China. Law in traditional China was exclusively penal and
reserved for cases of severe aberrations from societal norms. The gov-
ernment attempted to limit the use of law for settling commercial dis-
putes.8 One way it limited access to courts was to understaff them,
6. See, e.g., Robert Clark, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1238 (1981); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65
CH. KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary: Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 464 (1974) ("One needs an
extracultural standing place .... For nothing can be considered inefficiently achieved until one
discovers what the aim of the activity was."); WILLIAMSON, supra note 2, at 394-97.
7. For helping me discover how China enriches our understanding of a great variety of
issues in law and society, I am indebted to William P. Alford, Paul Cohen, R. Randle
Edwards, James Feinerman, William Jones, William C. Kirby, Hugh Scogin, and Jonathan D.
Spence. They all generously offered comments at various stages of the development of this
article, particularly on drafts I presented at the UCLA Center for Chinese Studies in
November 1989, the American Society of Legal History annual meeting in February 1990, at
the Association of Asian Studies annual meeting in April 1990, and at the Harvard East Asian
Legal Studies Center on February 21, 1991. I am also grateful to Simon Johnson, Dan Little,
and Terry Sicular for their consultation on the economic aspects of this study, and to Jim
Whitman for encouraging me to think about law and economic development in Chinese
history.
8. We do not yet know, however, how much success the government had.
Groundbreaking research on litigation rates in imperial China has just begun. See Melissa
MacCauley, Pettifoggers and the Problem of Litigiousness in Late Imperial China,
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underfund them, and restrict their numbers. The imperial govern-
ment permitted the operation of only one court per county, staffed by
only one judge, the imperial magistrate sitting in his official quarters,
the yamen.
It might seem axiomatic that law brings harmony and dissipates
chaos. But law in the real world is a complicated phenomenon, more
than a mere stabilizer. Under conditions of rapid change, law may
reduce economic chaos enough to permit growth. However, if the
change itself includes an overhaul of the legal system, new law may
disrupt commercial practices before merchants adapt their expecta-
tions.9 Because law enjoys varying degrees of success in conception
and implementation, it may not reduce chaos in every case. Legal
transplants are particularly susceptible to failure of implementation,
as they are conceived with a different context in mind. Law may also
increase chaos. At the individual's level, litigation increases chaos by
encouraging contention and drawing it out into the open. Destabi-
lizing collusive business networks also invites chaos, and such
destabilization was a principal contribution of courts to the local
economy of Shanghai. The experience of pre-communist Shanghai
shows that litigation destabilizes collusive business arrangements by
lowering barriers to market entry. Courts accomplished this by
reducing the risk and cost of non-collusive transactions.
This article tells the story of the courts and the marketplace in
Shanghai before 1949 in three parts. First, it briefly describes the
chaos and the growth of Shanghai's economy. Second, it summarizes
the rise of civil courts in Shanghai between 1849 and 1949. Third, it
explores five effects of the courts on the marketplace, those involving
property rights, local regulation, credit, the mutation of Shanghai's
collusive networks, and attitudes about the marketplace.
II. CHAOS IN A GROWING MARKETPLACE
Shanghai, in the century before 1949, experienced dynamic eco-
Presentation at the annual meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, New Orleans, Apr. 13,
1991.
9. Shanghai's economy grew rapidly despite the chaos. Discerning the relationship of
stability and economic growth, however, requires analysis beyond the scope of this paper. The
evidence presented in the current study suggests only preliminary and tentative observations
on this question. One could speculate that, without courts, economic chaos in open markets
can reach a point where it erodes the growth potential of a market economy. Courts as mere
dispute settlers do not create economic growth. Resources might be exhausted in lawsuits by
parties shifting pieces of the pie around rather than directing resources toward the expansion
of the numbers and types of transactions possible. Moreover, courts can in fact promote
growth by enforcing government regulations that keep market barriers low and encourage
local investments, and by favoring economic developers in dispute resolutions.
1338
COURTS OF SHANGHAI
nomic growth. As the population of Shanghai doubled and tripled
within a few decades,'" the city's development intensified. Contrac-
tors constructed 175,310 officially licensed buildings between 1890
and 1930 in the International Settlement alone." From 1928 through
1932, 8,971 new buildings were built in the city. 2 As of 1935, the two
foreign municipal councils and the local Chinese government laid
287,565 kilometers of road,' 3 278,370 meters of water mains, and
1,280,413 kilometers of electrical lines, 14 and granted easements for
the laying of the most advanced telephone system in the world.'"
Commerce in Shanghai thrived, integrating Shanghai more
strongly into the surrounding region.' 6 As access to international
trade networks grew, the number of transactions conducted in the city
soared. The value of imports and exports passing through Shanghai
between 1865 and 1930 increased fourteen-fold.' 7 As China's cash-
poor central regimes claimed massive contributions from the Imperial
Customs House in Shanghai, Shanghai grew in importance.'"
Industry developed rapidly. Between 1895 and 1911, Chinese
entrepreneurs set up 112 factories in Shanghai, with a total capitaliza-
10.
Total Population









*Figures for 1940 not available.
Calculated from Zou Yiren, Jiu Shanghai renkoin bianqian de yanjiu [Research on Demo-
graphic Change in Old Shanghai], Tables 1 & 22 (Renmin Chubanshe [People's Publishing
House] 1980).
11. Calculated from C.Y. Lo, TONGJIBIAO ZHONG ZHI SHANGHAI [SHANGHAI IN
STATISTICAL TABLES], Table 22, at 17.
12. SHANGHAISHI TONGJI [STATISTICS OF SHANGHAI], Tudi [land] section, Table 13, at 7.
13. Calculated from the 1936 SUPPLEMENT TO SHANGHAI TONGJI; Tables 5-6, at 92
[hereinafter 1936 SUPPLEMENT]. For statistics up to 1930, see Lo, supra note 11, Tables 108,
110, at 56-57.
14. 1936 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13, Tables 5-6, at 98-99. The Municipal Council
granted concessions to two private waterworks companies.
15. See 1936 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13, Table 18, at 104. The infrastructure laid in the
1920s and 1930s comprises the major portion of Shanghai's infrastructure today.
16. THOMAS RAWSKI, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PREWAR CHINA xx-xxi (1989).
17. Lo, supra note 11, Tables 183-185, at 87-89.
18. The total collection of the maritime customs in Shanghai was 175,363,474.13 Chinese
dollars in 1934 and 149,127,439.27 in 1935. 1936 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13, Shangye
[commerce] section, Table 13, at 61. For figures spanning a longer period, see STANLEY E.
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tion of 27,992,000.00 yuan.'9 By 1931, Shanghai was home to 1,687
manufacturing establishments; by 1932, to 2,710.20 The number of
spindles in Shanghai cotton mills jumped from 35,000 in 1890 to
2,850,745 in 1935.21
After 1870, Shanghai became China's financial center. Financial
institutions proliferated both in number and type. Nine types of lend-
ing institutions did business in Shanghai. The number of Chinese
lending institutions, called qianzhuang, exceeded 105 in 1875.22
Between 1897 and 1908, Chinese financiers founded in Shanghai five
of China's first modem style banks. By 1936 there were 90.23
Between 1890 and 1903, eight major foreign banks set up branches in
Shanghai. In 1936 there were twenty-eight. 24 Total capitalization
mounted. 5
Shanghai's economy grew in a highly unpredictable investment
climate of undercapitalized finance and commerce. Certain unregis-
tered banks, called diaotang, averaged an eight-percent bank loan-
capital ratio.26 The amount of currency in the coffers of registered
Chinese native banks averaged four-percent of their total assets.27
Consequently, the unregistered banks and qianzhuang lending institu-
WRIGHT, THE COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL OF THE MARITIME AND NATIVE CUSTOMS
REVENUE SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF 1911 (2d ed. 1966).
For some of the most important English language secondary literature on Shanghai's
economic growth, see SHANGHAI: REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AN ASIAN
METROPOLIS (Christopher Howe ed., 1981); Rhoads Murphey, The Treaty Ports and China's
Modernization, in THE CHINESE CITY BETWEEN Two WORLDS 17 (Mark Elvin & G.
William Skinner eds., 1974).
19. SHANGHAI SHI [THE HISTORY OF SHANGHAI], 364-68 (Tangzhen-Chang & Shenheng-
Chun eds.) (Shanghai renmin chubanshe [Shanghai People's Publishing House] 1989).
20. STATISTICS OF SHANGHAI, supra note 12, Gongye [industry] section, Tables 1, 3, at 1-
2.
21. ZHONGGUO JINDAI JINGJISHI TONGJI ZILIAO XUANJI (SELECTED COMPILATION OF
STATISTICAL MATERIALS FROM CHINA'S MODERN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1955)], Table 9, at
107-109.
22. SHANGHAI SHI NIANJIAN [ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI], Jinrong [finance]
section, at 1 (1937).
23. Id. Table 4, at 77-82.
24. Id. at 91.
25. THE HISTORY OF SHANGHAI, supra note 19, at 368-77. One of the first modem banks
began with a capitalization of 5,000,000 liang. In 1935, 89 out of 90 of Shanghai's native banks
were each capitalized at between 561,063 and 1,383,291,086 liang. ANNUAL MIRROR OF
SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Finance section, at 77-82. Numbers of qianzhuang: 1873: 178;
1883: 58; 1893: 82; 1910: 91. Total capitalization: 1903: 1,590,800.00 yuan; 1906:
1,241,800.00 yuan; 1909: 1,019,900.00 yuan. THE HISTORY OF SHANGHAI, supra note 19, at
368-77.
26. PARKS M. COBLE, THE SHANGHAI CAPITALISTS AND THE NATIONALIST
GOVERNMENT, 1927-1937, 17 (1986); 2 JULEAN ARNOLD, COMMERCIAL HANDBOOK OF
CHINA 373 (1920).
27. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Finance section, Table 4, at 77-82.
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tions defaulted frequently.28 Their liberal credit policy of lending
large amounts over long-term periods29 further contributed to Shang-
hai's financial volatility. Retailers, as ubiquitous and fundamental to
the economy as rice shops, ran on minimal secured assets, 30 and
industrial enterprises operated on slim capital reserves.3
Apart from having the propensity for high leveraging in finance
and commerce, the financial and commercial sectors of Shanghai per-
formed at the mercy of an unpredictable monetary and pricing envi-
ronment. Merchants used eleven different types of currency in their
transactions, some of them printed by local banks. 2 The exchange
rate of one local currency fluctuated within a twenty-five percent
range annually.33
Shanghai's volatile economy was all the more unsettling to its
natives because of its novelty. Before the arrival of significant num-
bers of foreign traders and goods, Chinese guilds had controlled
prices. Chinese merchants had traditionally operated within highly
developed, collusive networks. In late nineteenth century China,
merchants in the same trade formed associations (hul) that roughly
equated the guilds known in late medieval Europe. Guild members
fixed prices and put non-member entrepreneurs out of business by
boycotting them and coercing their employees. In some cases, guilds
worked in tandem with other guilds to form vertical monopolies, as
occurred with the price-fixing arrangement around the turn of the
century between construction laborers and construction materials
28. After 1933, the national government required higher margins of capital reserves in
Shanghai banks. Within two years, 30 out of 90 Shanghai banks failed. Fourteen more failed
the following year. Id. at 1-4. In 1936, the national government required Shanghai banks to
guarantee a portion of all deposits. The qianzhuang were chronically undercapitalized. James
C. Sanford, Chinese Commercial Organization and Behavior in Shanghai of the Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century (May 1976), 104, 106, 148-55 (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University).
29. Qian Hongchou, Fangshi zulin shjian dejigefalu guandian [Some Legal Points About
the Matter of Rental Housing], in DISHIWUJIE BIYE JINIANKAN [THE FIFTEENTH
GRADUATION CLASS YEARBOOK] (Shanghai fazheng xueyuan [Shanghai College of Law and
Politics], 1939) 232, "Zhulun" [articles] section, at 12.
30. SHANGHAI INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, SHANGHAI MISHI
DIAOCHA [AN INVESTIGATION OF RICE IN THE SHANGHAI MUNICIPALITY] 2-3 (1935).
31. Of the 91 cotton mills that reported data in 1935, eight were capitalized at 501 to 1000
dollars; 11 at 1001 to 2000 dollars; nine at 2001 to 3000 dollars; 16 at more than 100,001
dollars. 1936 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13, Industry section, Table 10, at 73. Of the 202
knitting mills for which data was available in 1935, one operated on 101 to 500 dollars; five on
501 to 1,000 dollars; 18 on 1,001 to 2000 dollars, 31 on 2,001 to 3000 dollars; and 16 on more
than 50,001 dollars. Id. Table 18, at 78.
32. THE HISTORY OF SHANGHAI, supra note 19, at 374.
33. THOMAS M. AINSCOUGH, BOARD OF TRADE-COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE, REPORT UPON THE CONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS OF BRITISH TRADE IN
CHINA, at 32-33 (1916).
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guilds in Shanghai, Canton, and other Chinese ports.34 Commercial
collusion existed on provincial and possibly county (xian) levels,
establishing price uniformity throughout the county.3 Itinerancy
developed and prevented commercial cellularity from isolating trade
networks within provinces and counties. Itinerancy, however, actu-
ally strengthened, rather than undermined, collusive networks.
Guilds in various commercial centers around China set up native
place associations (huiguan) in distant commercial centers, associa-
tions that functioned like branch offices of the guild. The guilds sta-
tioned members at these branch organizations for temporary duty,
and each branch worked to promote the interests of the guild in the
local economy by conciliating local merchants and regulating the
activities of guild members in that locality. 36 This system rapidly
equilibrated prices across counties and provinces.37
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, however,
the guilds lost control of the price mechanism. Foreign merchants
tied their prices to an international gold standard that fluctuated
daily. 38 Massive imports of British goods flooded the consumer-goods
market in Shanghai. Import prices, set independently by manufactur-
ers in Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and elsewhere, fluctu-
ated continually and destabilized local prices in Shanghai. 39 Half of
the imports were sold by weekly auction, sending fresh signals to the
rest of the city to readjust prices. Keen competition from Japanese
importers prevented the British from turning this auction process into
a controlled monopoly and from setting prices.40 Local bureaucrats,
34. T.R. JERNIGAN, CHINA IN LAW AND COMMERCE 242-43 (1905).
35. Id. at 243-44.
36. See HOSEA B. MORSE, THE GILDS OF CHINA 27-31 (1909); J. B. TAYLOR, FARM AND
FACTORY IN CHINA: ASPECTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 44 (1928); SHANGHAI
BEIKE ZILIAO XUANJI 1-7 (Shanghai People's Press 1980); Mark Elvin, The Administration of
Shanghai, 1905-1914, in THE CHINESE CITY BETWEEN Two WORLDS (Elvin & Skinner eds.,
1974), at 242.
37. RAWSKI, supra note 16, at 60-63.
38. 1936 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13, Table 14, at 16-17; 1 ARNOLD, supra note 26, at
265-67.
39. For example, the monthly value of imports into Shanghai fluctuated between
25,867,135 dollars and 56,856,198 dollars in 1935. 1936 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13,
"Shangye" [commerce] section, Table 8, at 56. Monthly index numbers of prices for imported
raw materials fluctuated between 105.6 and 135.6 in 1934. Id. Table 16, at 64. Average
monthly wholesale prices of cotton, for example, oscillated between 46.04 dollars and 34.36
dollars in 1934. Id. Table 19, at 66. Monthly wholesale prices of black tea in 1934 fluctuated
between 86.807 dollars per unit and 187.500 dollars per unit. Id. Table 18, at 65. Between the
third quarter of 1923 and the second quarter of 1924, the price of imported wool and cotton
underwear plummeted 55%. SHANGHAI MINISTRY OF FINANCE, BUREAU OF MARKETS,
SHANGHAI SHURU HUOWU GUANJIA ZHISHU BIAO [INDEX NUMBERS OF CUSTOMS IMPORT
PRICES IN SHANGHAI] 1 (table III) (Sept. 1925).
40. AINSCOUGH, supra note 33, at 23-24.
1342
COURTS OF SHANGHAI
setting tariffs and customs duties according to Shanghai market
prices, painstakingly attempted to follow the movement of local mar-
ket prices.41
Political upheaval also contributed to the economic uncertainty.
The most widespread grassroots rebellion in Chinese history scourged
the region surrounding Shanghai in the 1860s.12 The collapse of the
centuries-old Qing dynasty removed the underpinnings of central rule
in China in 191113 and sent shock-waves through the commercial and
financial sectors of Shanghai. The coup d'6tat dashed hopes for the
standardization of currency, weights, and measures and fueled a series
of financial crises that bankrupted most of Shanghai's native banks.
4
China finally standardized a national currency in 1933, but this cur-
rency was not vital to local financial transactions in Shanghai, as
banknotes or temporary extensions of credit provided a ready
substitute.4
Land rights grew problematic, and the complexity of the land
ownership system in Shanghai heightened the risk of disputes over
property title. As central authority deteriorated, land tenure became
subject to overlapping spheres of authority and fell victim to fraudu-
lent conveyances and genuine misunderstandings. The imperial Chi-
nese government recognized eleven different kinds of title documents.
In 1855, after crushing the Taiping rebels, the emperor annulled all
existing land deeds for Shanghai, had all landholdings in Shanghai
resurveyed, and issued special deeds to legitimize the ownership
claims at that moment. The deeds, called fangdan, contained the
name of the owner at the time of the general survey, but not the
names of subsequent landholders. Subsequent land transfers were
made with another type of deed, called a hongqi, registered with the
41. See Shanghai Ministry of Finance, Bureau of Markets, SHIYINIAN SHANGHAI SHURU
WUJIA YU SHUOJIA, SHIJIA Yu GUANJIA BuIAOBIAO [TABLES COMPARING SHANGHAI
MARKET PRICES OF DUTY-PAYING GOODS WITH THE TARIFF AND CUSTOMS VALUATIONS
OF 1922] (Dec. 1925).
42. See JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 170-78 (1990), for a
beautifully concise account of the Taiping Rebellion.
43. See JOSEPH W. ESHERICK, REFORM AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA: THE 1911
REVOLUTION IN HUNAN AND HUBEI (1976).
44. AINSCOUGH, supra note 33, at 33.
45. For the use of banknotes and temporary extensions of credit instead of currency in rent
transactions, see Qian, supra note 29, at 8-13. Merchants used bank drafts [zhipiao] when
purchasing wholesale goods. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 19, 1928 (Da Kangyang Co. v. Wu
Yanwei), Special District Court, untitled collection of judicial opinions, whose first item is
entitled JIANGSU SHANGHAI TEQU DIFANG FAYUAN XINGSHI PANJUE [JUDICIAL OPINION IN
CRIMINAL CASE AT JIANGSU (PROVINCE) SHANGHAI SPECIAL DISTRICT COURT] (Shanghai
College of Law, 1931) [hereinafter JIANGSU], Civil Case No. 1891, at 265-68. In December
1936, for example, Shanghai's major banks printed bank notes worth 1,409,943,000 yuan.
ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Finance section, at 178.
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dibao, the headman of the district in which the plot was situated, and
authenticated with the seal of the provincial treasurer. Fangdan and
hongqi still served as proof of ownership after the fall of the imperial
government and their provincial treasurers in 1911, as did the other
nine kinds of documents. These other documents created serious
questions of validity since they did not require an official seal, and
because they sufficiently proved ownership only in certain combina-
tions, not singly.
To further complicate land rights, these documents also served
purposes not originally intended. The local Chinese land office issued
one of these types of documents, shengke papers, for reclaimed waste-
land previously unregistered by afangdan. The claimant only needed
to pay all taxes due on the land preceding reclamation. In practice, if
afangdan was lost or destroyed, owners went to the Chinese govern-
ment land office in Shanghai and, for a fee of about fifty percent of the
land value, obtained a new deed in triplicate with the chop of the
dibao. The ease with which one could buy shengke papers led to their
fraudulent purchase and to fraudulent transfers of land ownership.
When a foreigner purchased land from a Chinese, the foreigner for-
warded the fangdan or shengke papers to the Chinese land office for
verification. The office issued a document, which the foreigner could
register in his consulate in exchange for a foreign title deed.46
Foreign consulates also registered land and held themselves out
as alternative authorities for verifying ownership. All fourteen con-
sulates issued consular title deeds for land registered with them. Land
plots in the International Settlement had to be registered in one of the
consulates in the name of an attorney of that consulate's nationality.
That consul and the attorney had to sign land and lease deeds every
time ownership or possession was transferred.47 The Joint Measure-
ment Office, the kuaizhangju, run by the immediate superior of the
Shanghai Magistrate, the Circuit Intendant (Daotai) for Jiangsu, also
had to validate each transaction involving plots in the International
Settlement. After the imperial regime fell, its function passed to an
office run jointly by the Municipal Council, the Shanghai Magistrate,
46. H.M. Cumine, Consular Registration of Land in Shanghai, CHINA L.J., Mar. 15, 1931,
at 10 (Fangdans recorded the various levels of the district in which the plot was situated. The
smallest official division of land in Shanghai was called the du. From 8 to 50 du comprised a
bao, and 30 bao made a qu. 19 qu formed the municipality of Shanghai). See map of
Shanghai, SHANGHAISHI ZIZHIZHI, [SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL SELF-GOVERNMENT RECORDS]
frontispiece.
47. Cumine, supra note 46, at 13. The British Consulate registered 13,600 lots between
1849 and 1931. In the same year, the Chinese conducted the imperial general survey of




the Circuit Intendant, and the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.
Several years later, the Land Office of a reconstituted pan-city govern-
ment, the Municipality of Greater Shanghai, assumed the function.4"
Shanghai's chaotic economy inspired strategies in business trans-
actions designed to cope with the uncertainty. Merchants' fear of risk
spawned an active insurance industry, an idea introduced by wes-
terners. Insurance on buildings, ships and shipped goods became rou-
tine.49 Both Chinese and foreign merchants employed in their
transactions a variety of methods for reducing the risk of loss from
non-performance. Some spread promisor liability with collateral
deposits and personal guarantors. Foreign merchants hired Chinese
middlemen to select Chinese merchants with whom to contract and to
guarantee their reliability. Both Chinese and foreign merchants
demonstrated creativity at finding ways to cope with uncertainty.
They devised the "commission indent system," a transaction form
that permitted trading firms to operate with minimal financial
resources. Exchange banks allowed extensive borrowing against
cargo and permitted partial payment systems. A British Commercial
Attache in Shanghai in 1916 reported that Shanghai firms conducted
more business in proportion to their capital than firms in virtually any
other city around the world."0
III. COURTS AND THE COMPETITION FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Foreigners initially introduced courts that enforced contracts in
Shanghai, primarily to facilitate commerce. Aside from a few mis-
sionaries and adventurers, foreigners came to Shanghai to seek com-
mercial profits.5 Merchants comprised eighty-six percent of an early
48. 1 ARNOLD, supra note 26, at 250.
49. 1 HuYou ZAJI [MISCELLANEOUS NOTES OF A SOJOURN IN SHANGHAI] 32b-33a
[hereinafter MISCELLANEOUS NOTES]. Fire insurance policies were common in Shanghai.
The fire insurance industry was highly developed. Separate types of coverage covered movable
and nonmovable property. Different types of buildings, shops in particular, and different types
of goods, such as durable goods and perishable goods, required coverage by separate policies.
The policy certificate had to specify the value and amount of goods covered. Flood and life
insurance were also available, though flood insurance covered only damage in peacetime. See
GUOMIN ZHENGFU XIN BANXING BAOXIANFA YANGJUE [DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE
PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT NEWLY PROMULGATED INSURANCE LAW] 194-97.
The main motivation for the widespread use of insurance in Shanghai was the protection
of commercial profits. See BAOXIANFA YAOGANG [OUTLINE OF INSURANCE LAW],
"Bianyan" [preface] (Shanghai New Construction Bookstore 1929) 1.
50. AINSCOUGH, supra note 33, at 32-36; Foreign Office records, Public Records Office,
Surrey, England, 656 series, 1905-1930 [hereinafter FO] 656/126, Oct. 14, 1912 (memorandum
on the case of Shen Shun-ch'un v. Wu A-tao and Shen Chin-hsiang) at 2; Tudi zhangcheng,
infra note 143, at art. 4.
5 1. See ZHONGGUO FAZHISHI JIAOCHENG [A GUIDE TO CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY] 324-
30 (Xue Mei, ed. 1988).
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group of 143 foreigners who set up residence there.5 2 Once there, for-
eign merchants had trouble penetrating the interior of China.53
Though the reasons for the impermeability are still poorly under-
stood, a growing body of evidence contradicts the perception that
China lacked a sophisticated system of commerce in which foreigners
could participate.54 Rather, highly developed trade networks in the
interior impeded foreign access and confronted foreign merchants
with a closed, collusive market.
For centuries, foreigners tried and failed to get the Chinese
national government to intervene on their behalf and to lower barriers
to Chinese commerce." But when in 1843 Britain emerged victorious
from a military confrontation precipitated by Chinese imperial efforts
to block the growth of the foreign drug market in China, representa-
tives of fourteen foreign governments extracted imperial permission to
move into Shanghai and set up consular courts.5 6 These courts at first
served foreigners and helped them gain access to the local markets by
enforcing the contracts they made with Chinese.5 7 Freer markets in
turn allowed foreigners greater access to China's economy.
Foreigners set up the first sixteen civil courts in Shanghai,
including fourteen consular courts and two "mixed" courts, in the
1840s through 1880s. The consular courts tried all suits against their
own nationals. A complex set of rules based on both territory and
nationality loosely defined the jurisdictions of the mixed courts.
52. Excluded from this count are the families of the male merchants, because these
families are not enumerated. THE DIAMOND JUBILEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT
OF SHANGHAI, frontispiece (I. Kounin & A. Yaron eds. 1940). Even at a time when the
settlement was almost a century old, census results show that ninety percent of the foreign
male population consisted of accountants, bankers, brokers, clerks, construction engineers,
mercantile assistants, merchants and storekeepers. Fifty percent of the foreign population
were merchants alone. MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, Nov. 20, 1920, at 382-83.
53. "British makers... have always regarded [China] as a difficult and expensive market
to work .... " AINSCOUGH, supra note 33, at 28.
54. See JERNIGAN, supra note 34, at 238-41. The best English-language studies of China's
commerce in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth century are SUSAN MANN,
LOCAL MERCHANTS AND THE CHINESE BUREAUCRACY, 1750-1950 (1987); MARY B.
RANKIN, ELITE ACTIVISM AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN CHINA (1986); RAWSKI,
supra note 16; WILLIAM T. ROWE, HANKOW: COMMERCE AND SOCIETY IN A CHINESE
CITY, 1796-1889 (1984); MADELEINE ZELIN, THE MAGISTRATE'S TAEL: RATIONALIZING
FISCAL REFORM IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY CHINA (1984).
55. Some of these efforts are described in A GUIDE TO CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY, supra
note 51, at 324-30. For the best English language summary of the political events during the
residence of British and American merchants in China, see SPENCE, supra note 42.
56. See, e.g., LEWIS HERTSLET, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS, vol. X, 56-59, 69-72; vol.
XII, 281-17 (1st reprinting, 1970, Johnson Reprinting Corp.).
57. The British Consul in Shanghai kept in his files letters requesting advice and assistance
in many such cases, e.g. FO 656/124, Letters from Hanson, McNeil and Jones to British
Assessor, Sept. 28, 1910.
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Additionally, in 1906 the United States Congress founded a federal
district court in Shanghai, attempting to align the law administered
by Americans in China more closely with United States federal law.58
The International Mixed Court of Shanghai was established in
1864. It had police backing and a broad enough jurisdiction to exer-
cise authority over almost every type of commercial dispute, as well as
over every breach of local government regulation of the local econ-
omy. In terms of caseload, it was the largest of all of the Shanghai
courts until 1949, trying about five and a half million cases during its
seventy-eight years of operation.59 The term "mixed" referred to the
multi-national composition of the bench.' Panels of two judges, one
.Chinese and one from any of thirteen foreign nationalities, presided
over every case. The lawyers and litigants appearing before the courts
were also "mixed." Fourteen nationalities of lawyers and over forty
nationalities of litigants were involved in cases at the International
Mixed Court. The court exercised territorial jurisdiction over the
International Settlement, a district governed by a multi-national but
British-dominated body called the Municipal Council. An annual
assembly of foreign merchants elected the Municipal Council and
approved the Council's municipal programs by articulating bylaws,
which the International Mixed Court then enforced.6'
Despite the controversiality of the foreign-run courts on Chinese
soil, the local Chinese elite soon adapted to the new procedures for
dispute resolution. Chinese in Shanghai used the mixed civil courts in
steady numbers after the mixed courts lowered the cost of litigating in
the 1900s and 1910s. Between 1913 and 1926, Chinese litigation at
the International Mixed Court held steady at about 1,700 cases filed
per month, an annual total of about 32,000 lawsuits.62 More Chinese
58. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. pt. I, 814 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 797 (1907)).
59. This is my own rough estimate, based on actual annual figures for the total number of
prosecutions for 1867-1869, 1874-1900, 1913-1926, and 1940-1942, plus civil summonses
served or civil cases filed for 1896-1898, 1913-1926, and 1933-1942, as listed in the Shanghai
Municipal Council Annual Reports for those years, Shanghai Municipal Archives. A French
scholar of international law in the 1920s believed that the International Mixed Court handled
more cases than any other court in the world at that time. Jean Escarra, The
Extraterritoriality Problem, 2 CHINA L. REV. 15, 19 (1929).
60. The British founded two other mixed courts in China at this time.
61. Aside from pressures from its constituencies, the Municipal Council had an additional
incentive to encourage enforcement of its licensing laws: It was looking for operations
revenues because no sovereign power supported it. License fees generated about 13% of the
Council's budget and the fines extracted from violators of regulations fell to the council's
treasury.
62. The Chinese civil cases heard, exclusive of the figure for 1920, and the foreign civil
cases filed, exclusive of figures for 1913 and 1919 but including the partial figure for foreign
civil cases heard for 1913, add up to 32,262 cases.
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than foreigners sued in the International Mixed Court; however, as a
percentage of their respective populations in the International Settle-
ment or in Shanghai as a whole, fewer Chinese per capita brought
suit.
63
TABLE I - YEARLY NUMBER OF CIVIL CASES BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MIXED COURT: 1912-1926 6




1913 1,667/ 536 15867
1914 1,816/ 904 442/264
1915 1,847/1,001 344/108
1916 1,776/ 986 238/ 76
1917 1,567/ 823 337/105
1918 1,726/ 998 274/130
1919 1,445/ 873 299/124
1920 414/
1921 1,690/1,016 610/183
1922 1,798/ 889 894/243




63. According to my calculations from demographic figures for 1925, 96% of the
population of the International Settlement was Chinese (810, 278 out of 840, 226) and 1.5% of
the total population of Shanghai was non-Chinese. Calculated from Zou, supra note 10, Tables
56 & 57; SHANGHAISHI TONGJI [STATISTICS OF SHANGHAI], "Renkou" [population] section,
Tables II & 17 of population figures.
64. SHANGHAI MUN. COUNC. ANN. REP. (1912-1941) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]
("Mixed Court" sections (1912-1926) and "Municipal Advocate" sections (1927-1941)).
65. Of all the foreign civil suits from 1918 to 1926, about 97% involved a foreigner suing a
Chinese, and about 3% were foreigners suing foreigners. Not one case involved a Chinese
suing a foreigner. Calculations are based on figures and litigant names compiled from Mixed
Court Monthly Reports in the MUNICIPAL GAZETTE and from the ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 64, at 57A-58A, 67A-68A (1921), 70A (1922), 39 (1923), 45, 47 (1924), 39-41 (1925); raw
figures for 1926 came from William Johnstone, The International Settlement at Shanghai
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University), at 135 (1929). Sikhs suing Chinese for
unpaid debts made up the majority of the foreign civil cases. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 64, at 38 (1926) (Court Accountant's report).
66. Cases waiting for first hearing. Both figures are my own estimates, based on monthly
figures available for six months in 1912.
67. Cases heard, calculated from monthly court reports for all months of 1914 except




The International Mixed Court handled the largest civil caseload
of the Shanghai courts.68 Demand for adjudication of commercial
disputes outstripped the ability of the court to provide the service.
Yearly figures labelled "Chinese civil suits awaiting first hearing"
attest to a growing backlog of Chinese cases at the International
Mixed Court, despite the growing numbers tried.69  Moreover, Chi-
nese use of the court as a percentage of the court's total civil caseload
rose between 1908 and 1925. This trend occurred despite the growing
influence of the foreign judges and the increasing controversiality of
the court among Chinese in Beijing and Nanjing and even among for-
eign observers in China and abroad. In 1908, the court for purely
Chinese suits at the Mixed Court was in session about one fourth the
time the court for foreign suits spent on its cases. By 1925, however,
Chinese suits outnumbered foreign suits about four to one.7°
The French Mixed Court, founded in 1869, tried roughly two
fifths of the civil cases at the International Mixed Court.71 In 1914, it
moved to a new building in the French consular compound where it
remained until it was phased out during World War II. In 1931 it
changed its name to Second Special District Court as part of an
attempt by national bureaucrats to align its procedures and subject
matter jurisdiction with those of the Chinese courts.7 2 Under the
innocuous new label, its civil division continued to handle a rich vari-
68. The consular courts heard far fewer suits owing at least in part to their nationality
jurisdiction, which precluded Chinese from suing Chinese there. From 1921 to 1925, for
example, their combined caseload amounted to about 0.5 percent of the International Mixed
Court caseload. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 55A, 66A (1921), 68A, 73A (1922), 37,
42 (1923), 59-60 (1924), 55 (1925), 54 (1926); Monthly Police Reports in the Shanghai
Municipal Gazette, 1924-25.
Without more, the number of cases heard does not indicate that resources were
proportionately allocated to these cases. However, the fact that the court hired more judges to
hear these cases, that it extended its Chinese civil sessions into the wee hours of the morning
and into Saturdays, and that its Registrar complained to the public that the Court needed
more money for courtrooms, shows an increased allocation of Court resources to these cases.
See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, (1921-25).
69. One can only speculate why this backlog accumulated. The Court may have been
short of funds, or may have felt obligated to divert its funds to best fulfill its primary mission of
meeting foreign litigation needs. However, even foreign civil cases waited about six months
between petition and first hearing. Id. (1913-25) (Mixed Court Reports).
70. My calculation is based on caseload statistics compiled from the ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 64, the MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, supra note 52, and reports by British consular
officials taken from the collection of documents cited as FO, supra note 50 (on file with the
author).
71. This number is an estimate, based on the ratios of reported cases in the SHENBAO and
on published caseload statistics from the two courts after 1930. Reports of court sessions,
SHENBAO (China), Jan.-Dec. 1914.
72. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, "Sifa" (judicial] section at 12.
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ety of debt and contract disputes between Chinese parties."
What motivated Chinese to petition the foreign-controlled,
adversarial style mixed courts for a judgment against a fellow Chi-
nese? The answer lies in the courts' structure. The courts insinuated
themselves into the Shanghai commercial scene and sustained their
own growth by encouraging litigation through measures that reduced
costs for plaintiffs.
The courts offered Chinese litigants an attractive forum in four
ways. First, the courts had the power to enforce their judgments.
The two foreign municipal governments of Shanghai organized and
funded professional police forces that were highly-armed and trained
to carry out orders. These forces principally carried out court sum-
monses and arrest warrants, detained civil defendants awaiting trial,
and enforced court judgments. Second, the courts catered to plain-
tiffs, the people who initiated civil lawsuits. The courts' procedure
tended to favor plaintiffs, and most of the court orders and judgments
carried out plaintiffs' requests. Third, the courts were accessible to a
wide variety of Chinese. The International Mixed Court carved out a
broad subject matter jurisdiction for itself. The rich variety of suits
welcomed at the court met the needs of a wide spectrum of Chinese
merchants and offered them opportunities to challenge the collusive
structure of the guilds. Finally, the courts faced little competition
from other fora, such as Chinese courts until 1927 and tribunals run
by merchant organizations, for the effective settling of certain types of
commercial disputes.
A. Enforcement
Civil plaintiffs and criminal complainants in the mixed courts
were confident that the people they accused or with whom they had
disputes would be subject to the courts' jurisdiction. The Shanghai
Municipal Police enforced the International Mixed Court's orders
and judgments and ran its debtor's prison. The police force was large
and well-armed,74 aggressively invoked its investigatory powers, and
73. Id.
74. The police force employed 2,662 officers in 1922; 2,501 on active-duty (239 European,
30 Japanese, 713 Sikhs, 1,489 Chinese, and an additional 30 mounted policemen), and 161 on
reserve duty. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 56A (1922). The total number of recruits
grew to 3,195 in 1925. Id. at 29-30, 35 (1925). Among the 2,662 officers in 1922, 1,928 were
trained and qualified to use the .303 Lee-Enfield Rifle. The rifle was used by the British army
between 1818 and 1952. 257 officers were qualified to use the powerful colt .45 automatic
pistol, 92 were qualified to use a .45 revolver, and 48 were qualified to use a .32 automatic
pistol. IAN V. HOGG, MILITARY PISTOLS AND REVOLVERS, (Arms and Armour Press, 1987),
at 24-26, 36; BRITISH RIFLES, A CATALOGUE OF THE ENFIELD PArERN RooM (London:
HMSO Publications Centre, 1981), at 22-23, 41, 48; JOHN KIRK & ROBERT YOUNG, JR.,
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pursued its authority to make arrests. Officers of the Shanghai
Municipal Police at the International Mixed Court staffed Shanghai's
only governmental office specializing in making arrests. The office
was famous for its speed and success in locating and arresting
suspects."5
For the mixed courts and their prisons, funding posed no prob-
lem. The Municipal Council bankrolled the International Mixed
Court, even after it became the First Special District Court, 6 until
1941," when Japanese troops shut down the court and incarcerated
its foreign personnel. 8
The courts took special measures to ensure that their judgments
were enforced. Civil litigants who disobeyed court orders were sub-
ject to criminal sanctions.7 9 The International Mixed Court devel-
oped three procedural devices that reduced the risk of noncompliance
with its decisions: pre-judgment detention of civil defendants, the
security deposit (baozhengin), and the sealing order. These devices
GREAT WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR II (Walker and Co. ed., 1990), at 316; ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 64, at 63A (1922).
75. 1 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES, supra note 49, at 17a-17b; see also Shanghai Municipal
Police files, 1O Dossiers, files 9287, 9583, correspondence and warrant specimens, Oct.
through Nov. 1928.
The Municipal Police carried out about 1,800 arrest warrants a month. The Judicial
Police, then in Chinese control, executed 274 of the Court's arrests. FO, supra note 50, 656/
205; Municipal Advocate's Report for July 1930 and Shanghai Municipal Police files, 1O
Dossiers, file 7245, Sept. 21, 1931, memorandum no. 64.
76. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, (1927-41). Local Chinese, possibly with the aid of
foreigners, must have financed the District Court between 1927 and 1941 just as they had
previously financed the Caipansuo and Shenpanting. National funds supplied the office of the
prosecutor and the prisons in Shanghai, but not the courts. ZHONGGUO ZHI CIFA [CHINA'S
JUDICIARY] (SHANGHAI MINZHI SHUJU FAXING [DISTRIBUTED BY SHANGHAI PEOPLE'S
KNOWLEDGE BOOK BUREAU], 1932), part 2, "Benlun" [main part of the exposition] section,
at 119.
77. See ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 13. The
Council retained control of the court finances through its appointment of the Court Clerk, the
successor of the Registrar. Shanghai Municipal Police files, 10 Dossiers, file 7245, Feb. 23,
1929, report of R. Bryan to Stirling Fessenden. The terms of an official written agreement
between foreign diplomats and the Chinese Foreign Ministry distributed the operating
responsibilities of the court between the Municipal Council, Municipal Police, and Chinese
officials. The agreement remained in effect between 1927 and 1936, with one set of
modifications in 1930. Shanghai Municipal Police files, 10 Dossiers, file 7245, May 14, 1935.
Cooperation between provincial Chinese officials and the Municipal Council was even closer
than the terms of the agreement indicated. The Nanjing Viceroy allowed the Municipal Police
to retain their full control of the Registrar's office at the time of the official transfer, despite
prohibitions in the agreement. Telegram from Ding Wenjian and Xu Yuan to Nanjing Viceroy
(Jan. 1, 1927) (on file with the Shanghai Municipal Archives, file 179.4.4).
78. Interview with attorney Jiang Bingfan, in Shanghai (May 1991). The invasion is
described in the semi-autobiographical account by J.G. BALLARD, EMPIRE OF THE SUN
(1984).
79. Judgment of July 2, 1931 (Tu Songsheng), JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 7.
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assured plaintiffs that filing petitions would result in injury and incon-
venience to the defendant if the defendant did not cooperate.
The Shenpanting and the International Mixed Court placed all
civil defendants in detention facilities until judgment. The purpose of
pre-trial custody at the Mixed Court was twofold. First, the court's
small territorial jurisdiction required it to use vigilance and force to
ensure that civil defendants would appear at their hearing and comply
with the judgment of the court. Second, the court hoped to prevent
defendants from continuing to engage in the conduct to which the
plaintiff objected.8 0
To soften the harshness of this procedure, the courts released the
defendant if he or a guarantor deposited a security with the Mixed
Court Registrar. The Mixed Court retained the security if the defend-
ant failed to appear at his hearing."1 Defendants could file counter-
petitions against the persons suing them, compelling them to deposit a
security at the court to guarantee their appearance in court.82 The
practice provided a hostage,8 3 which decreased the risk of noncompli-
ance with the court's judgment. The International Mixed Court
crafted this feature of its civil procedure out of a customary rule used
among contracting merchants that relatives or a designated guarantor
of a debtor could be compelled to make good the debt. 4 The security
deposit at the Mixed Court thus forced wealthy relatives or associates
of defendants in debt suits to compensate creditors if the defendant
failed to make payment.8 " Chinese courts also followed this proce-
dure during the period.86
B. Pro-Plaintiff
The procedure and judgment of the International Mixed Court
favored plaintiffs and creditors. Many procedures, such as the
requirements for filing a petition and a summons request, were user-
80. Such as tearing down boundary markers. See, e.g., FO, supra note 50, 656/116, Dec.
28, 1908; ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section at 158.
81. Rules of Procedure, Rule 6, Civil Proceedings, at 6.
82. Rules of Procedure, Rule 27, Civil Proceedings, at 10.
83. See Kronman, supra note 2, at 12-15.
84. FO, supra note 50, 656/110, Sept. 12, 1906.
85. See, e.g., Dengbao shengming zhi nuli [The effect of newspaper announcement],
SHENBAO (China), Aug. 8, 1914; FO, supra note 50, 656/118, Dec. 10, 1909 (letter from
Harold Browett, esq., to British Assessor Coales).
86. See ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section at 158; Articles
12-14, Revised Provisional Regulations Covering Trial Proceedings by a Magistrate,
promulgated Mar. 30, 1923, in COE LAW, 348-49; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 38, 40
(1926). See also ANATOL KOTENEV, SHANGHAI: ITS MIXED COURT AND COUNCIL (1968,
reprint of 1925 version) 232, 294, 302-04; ANATOL KOTENEV, SHANGHAI: ITS
MUNICIPALITY AND THE CHINESE 212 (1927).
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friendly. The Mixed Court speedily issued orders to evict tenants and
to confiscate tenant or creditor possessions after a minimal showing of
the existence of a dispute and of its magnitude.s7
The sealing order was a good example of a Mixed Court proce-
dure that effectuated a plaintiff's request with little effort or cost to the
plaintiff, and one that eliminated the formality of a trial. Landlords
or creditors, without filing a petition, provided a tenant's or debtor's
name and address to the court, which issued an order either sealing
the premises until rent was paid or authorizing the immediate sale of
the tenant's belongings. Issuance of a sealing order encouraged settle-
ment of the dispute because tenants typically valued their business
and possessions more than the amount owed. Moreover, the landlord
or creditor could request an arrest warrant for the tenant or debtor
without going to trial. This procedure further induced settlement.8
In 1908, the sealing procedure was standardized to allow the
landlord or creditor to request a "distress warrant," to immediately
seal the tenant's home, and to secure the tenant's possessions as col-
lateral. The court required neither proof nor a hearing to issue these
orders, although their effect was as severe and permanent as a court
judgment. The application required only the applicant's name and
address, the tenant's name and amount owed, a description of the
property, the period for which rent was owed, and the date it had
come due. 9 Before 1909, the procedure cost nothing to the landlord
or creditor. After 1909, the landlord or creditor paid the court a fee,
but recovered it from the tenant with the back rent or by selling the
tenant's possessions.9° The Mixed Court Chinese judge signed the
warrant before 10:00 a.m. the day after the request was filed. Runners
delivered the signed warrant to the central Municipal Police station,
where the landlord picked it up. Speed of delivery was critical
because news about distress warrants spread quickly, causing tenants
to remove their belongings before the landlord arrived to seal the
premises.9' Unless paid additional money, runners frequently delayed
six hours, providing time for tenants to remove their possessions from
the homes. 92 After 1911, the Mixed Court Chinese judge issued war-
rants directly to the landlord who proceeded to the police station clos-
87. FO, supra note 50, 656/111, June 5, 1906; 656/133, Nov. 20, 1914.
88. Id. 656/111, Jan. 3, 1906; 656/111, Feb. 2, 1906; 656/116, Oct. 13, 1908; 656/118,
July 2, 1909; 656/118, July 17, 1909; 656/126, July 15, 1912; 656/131, Aug. 1, 1913; 656/141,
Aug. 10, 1917.
89. Rules of Procedure, Rules 91-97, Civil Proceedings, at 22.
90. FO, supra note 50, 656/126, Aug. 7, 1911.
91. Id. 656/116, May 9, 1908.
92. Id. 656/116, Jan. 7, 1908.
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est to the property.93
The court's pro-creditor judgments facilitated the redistribution
of massive amounts of forfeited wealth,94 especially during acute peri-
ods of economic volatility. By December 1921, so many bankruptcy
cases were before the court that it hired a large accounting firm to
maintain records of the claims and amounts involved. 95 The court's
pro-creditor stance was well-known. Daily newspaper reports
informed merchants about developments in pending suits. Addition-
ally, business networks quickly spread the news of large awards to
creditors. In their eagerness to avail themselves of the court's serv-
ices, creditors normally set forth their claims at the Mixed Court the
day a firm closed.96
The multiplicity of courts with overlapping jurisdictions created
a favorable forum shopping environment that further benefitted plain-
tiffs. Although territorial jurisdictions could be separated neatly by
city district, frequent population movement across those boundaries
gave rise to the need to further define jurisdiction by some minimal
contacts rule, a rule that never clearly materialized. The Interna-
tional Mixed Court and the French Mixed Court were aware of the
jurisdictional overlap and tried to devise clear jurisdictional bounda-
ries, but clever attorneys continued manipulating the system and
bringing their clients' claims before the most favorable tribunal.97
The Mixed Court practice of civil detention was also pro-plaintiff
because anyone could file a lawsuit and obtain a warrant causing
another person's detention. Pre-trial detention placed defendants and
their pocketbooks at the mercy of anyone suing them. A defendant's
absence from his business while in custody afforded his creditors the
opportunity to seize his assets.98 Similarly, a foreigner who accused a
Chinese of squatting on his land could request the court to detain the
Chinese long enough to level the defendant's house.99
93. Rules of Procedure, Rule 94, Civil Proceedings, at 22.
94. See, e.g., the bankruptcy of Gu Chenzhong, President of the Dahua girls' school.
Zaizhi Gu Chenzhong zhi zhaiwu [More on the debt of Gu Chenzhong], SHENBAO (China), Oct.
5, 1914.
95. FO, supra note 50, 656/164, Dec. 1, 1921 (letter from Wang Tsze Kong to British
Assessor).
96. Id. 656/141, Jul. 27, 1917 (letter from General Electric Co. of China Ltd. to British
Assessor regarding bankruptcy of Hanson Electrical Co.).
97. See, e.g., Dipi jiuge [real estate dispute] and Yizhuan baoshan xian tiandi jiuge'an nei
zhi renzheng [Witness Testifies in Land Dispute Transferred from Baoshan District], SHENBAO
(China), June 4, 1914.
98. See FO, supra note 50, 656/124, Aug. 5, 1910 (letter of Hugo Reiss & Co. to a Mr.
Wilson regarding the suit against Wo Bay Zung cigar shop).
99. Id. 656/116, Dec. 11, 1908, Dec. 28, 1908 (letters from D.A. Darling, Manager of
Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd., to British judge).
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Defendants lacking the means for a security deposit or guaran-
tors, or whose guarantors reneged on their promises, were forced, if
they could afford it, to hire expensive foreign attorneys to press the
court for their release. One defendant argued that detention in civil
cases was illegal without grounds for suspecting the defendant would
abscond. 1°° The court remained hostile to such appeals, 10 holding
that Rule 8 of the Mixed Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vided an exception to release on security, worked against, not in favor
of, the defendant. In other words, if the court suspected the defend-
ant would abscond, he was not released even if he had the necessary
funds. Even during the course of the suit, the plaintiff could have the
defendant arrested and detained simply by making an ex parte appli-
cation, "supported by satisfactory evidence" that the defendant "is
about to abscond from the jurisdiction of the Court." The definition
of "satisfactory evidence" was vague. 0 2 The defendant could gain
release temporarily to gather witnesses, but only after paying the
expenses for their court appearance and only if accompanied by a
Municipal Police escort. 103 Guarantors were also imprisoned if they
defaulted on their promise to provide the defendant's security."° The
security bond procedure was sufficiently standardized to allow use of
a boilerplate form in English. Issued at the Mixed Court Registrar's
office, it provided blanks for the nationality of the presiding foreign
judge, the date, the case name, the name and signature of the guaran-
tor, his address, the name of the defendant, and the signatures of the
Registrar and the foreign judge. Seeking release imposed a time-con-
suming and expensive burden on the defendant. In at least one case,
the defendant located a guarantor who supplied an additional $5,000
security simply to buy the defendant's freedom during the approval
time. The British judge sent memoranda to the Mixed Court Regis-
trar approving or disapproving the guarantor. 05
C. Accessibility
The mixed and foreign courts, and the Chinese courts modeled
after them, were accessible institutions, despite their formal court set-
100. Id. 656/111, Sept. 11, 1906.
101. Id. 656/110, Sept. 12, 1906.
102. Rules of Procedure, Rule 8, Civil Proceedings, at 7.
103. FO, supra note 50, 656/110, June 22, 1906.
104. Id. 656/118, Jan. 8, 1909.
105. Even when this procedure involved a Chinese defendant and guarantor, the British
judge, not the Chinese judge, was responsible for approving security bonds. Around 1913 the
Security Office at the Court began issuing the rulings. Id. 656/131, Mar. 17, 1913; 656/131,
Jul. 24, 1913; 656/131, Mar. 18, 1913; 656/131, Mar. 20, 1913.
1993] 1355
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1335
tings. In fact, the Municipal Police encouraged Chinese to file peti-
tions for civil suits in the International Mixed Court. 10 6 Using the
courts was not free, but courts acted to lessen the expense. Fees were
low, attorneys were not required, and procedures for initiating suits
were simple.
What obstacles there were, such as fees, waiting periods, and
jurisdictional hurdles, the mixed courts attempted to reduce. For-
eigners paid no fees to file a lawsuit at the International Mixed Court,
while Chinese litigants paid minor ones. Waiting the several weeks or
months between filing and execution of judgment required patience.
Yet, the International Mixed Court attempted to reduce the waiting
period by appointing more judges, expediting trials, and scheduling
hearings late into the night and on Saturdays.' 7
Defendants bore the brunt of the costs of litigating at the Inter-
national Mixed Court. The plaintiff paid nothing extra to have a per-
son summoned and detained until hearing and judgment. To be
released from detention to gather evidence or to protect assets, the
defendant had to arrange for a personal guarantor to deposit a secur-
ity, often thousands of dollars, and to persuade the judge at a prelimi-
nary hearing of his reliability. These practices made delays in the
lawsuit more burdensome for defendants than for plaintiffs. Litiga-
tion at the International Mixed Court put the burden on the defend-
ant to such an extent that plaintiffs began to bring frivolous suits for
the purpose of locking up their enemies in civil detention, to tarnish
their business reputation or to raid their assets. Such delays exacer-
bated the uncertainty of all future business prospects for the
defendant.'0
106. See the case of Mr. Wong and Mr. Dian, infra part IV.B.
107. The criminal section of the Mixed Court tried an average of 60 cases during each
session. Over time the Court increased the number of sessions per day from an average of five
or six to eight or more. FO, supra note 50, 656/175, Feb. 21, 1923 (Mixed Court Registrar's
Report regarding "Court Accommodation"). The author's calculations are based on figures in
GAZETTE, July 27, 1922, at 258; Jan. 15, 1923, at 7; Oct. 30, 1924, at 407; Apr. 9, 1925, at 155;
Dec. 10, 1925, at 395; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 56A, 68A (1922). By July, 1922,
the traffic court heard up to 58 cases per session. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 60A,
69A (1922); MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, Apr. 28, 1921, at 172; Sept. 26, 1923, at 274. See also the
"Traffic" section of monthly Police Reports in MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, 1923-25. Chinese civil
courts heard about five cases each session, while foreign civil courts each handled fewer than
two per session. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 56A, 168A (1922); MUNICIPAL
GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1924, at 407; Apr. 9, 1925, at 155; Dec. 10, 1925, at 395. Rent cases were
tried in separate sessions, "squeezed in" early in the morning before the regular civil courts
commenced. FO, supra note 50, 656/175, Feb. 21, 1923 (Mixed Court Registrar's Report
regarding "Court Accommodation.").
108. The court staff suspected this to be a common motive for lawsuits. See ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 64, at 56A (1913).
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As proof of the court's accessibility, so many poor Chinese
brought suits in the International Mixed Court without the aid of
counsel, that the court created a special session to hear these cases
and reduce the backlog plaguing its docket.1 9 The First and Second
Special District Courts later continued this service.' 10
The three district courts agreed to entertain a wide variety of
suits, thereby refusing to make subject matter a barrier to litigation.
When determining justiciability, the courts did not impose onerous
evidentiary thresholds. Agreements struck between the parties did
not have to be in writing, since courts enforced both oral and written
contracts. To maintain their claims, plaintiffs did not have to produce
eye witnesses. Nor did the mixed courts enforce territory-based juris-
dictional rules that would have kept certain litigants out.I' Conse-
quently, these three courts were accessible to virtually all Chinese for
suing their fellow Chinese. It is proof of the courts' accessibility that
a wide range of Chinese congregated in their courtrooms."I2
The International Mixed Court made its subject matter jurisdic-
tion amenable to merchants' needs by refusing to limit its scope.
Many claims brought to the Mixed Court involved trivial amounts of
money. Typically, claims brought by utilities against small Chinese
businesses or evicted families aimed to recover merely a gas fixture or
a rice boiler. 13 Companies and individuals sued Chinese for amounts
as small as a few "Mexican dollars""' 4 or for the replacement of per-
sonal clothing and linens." 5 On the other hand, the court heard con-
tract suits involving damages clauses of 50,000 taels, 1 6 corporate
debts of $100,000, and corporate mortgages of 531,911 taels. 117
Litigants could bring any style of dispute to the courts. Debt
109. MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, Apr. 22, 1915, at 155.
110. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 15, 27.
111. Id. at 4-5, 12.
112. 3 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES, supra note 49, at 21.
113. FO, supra note 50, 656/124, Aug. 24, 1910 (letter from Shanghai Gas Co. to British
Assessor).
114. See petition in Shanghai Electric Construction Co. v. Chang Yoa Sung, in FO, supra
note 50, 656/111, June 5, 1906 (letter from Stokes, Platt & Teesdale regarding Kishan Singh v.
Zang Hang Sun and Uttam Singh v. Tsung Tsun Zee and Ou Ziang Zee); id. 656/131, June 27,
1913 (letter from Shanghai Gas Co. to British judge Garstin); id. 656/116, Feb. 18, 1908 (letter
from T.L. Bickerton & Co. to British judge Barton).
115. FO, supra note 50, 656/124, Sept. 1910 (letter from Daniel Wood to British judge
regarding his suit against Kwa Yseng & Co.); id. 656/111, Jan. 22, 1906 (letter from J. Moosa
to British judge Twyman).
116. FO, supra note 50, 656/175, May 30, 1924 (petition, notice of motion, and answer in
Foh Hsing Chong Hong v. Yue Hsing Co. and Tsu Wong Sz).
117. Id. 656/124, May 7, 1910 (petition in the case of Chun Shun Yee v. Chun Shing
Cheong); id. 656/131, Feb. 4, 1913 (petition and judgment in the case of Chen Yih Tsai v.
Yuen Woo, Yah Hsing, and Loong Sheng).
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disputes were the most common, and "debt" covered a wide variety of
obligations, including contract breaches, bankruptcies, liquidations,
and disputed accounts.1 8 The courts enforced a rich variety of pri-
vate contracts, from oral debt promises between individual peddlers,
to complex exclusive-dealing contracts and restriction-of-trade agree-
ments between major corporations. The remedies sought ranged from
compensatory damages to permanent injunctions to restrain corpora-
tions from holding directors and shareholders meetings." 9
Both the breadth and novelty of the subject matter jurisdiction of
the mixed courts not only did not discourage, it attracted litigation.
For plenary judicial remedies, the International Mixed Court offered
a single process for all disputes, excluding no subject matters. The
process put police power at the service of anyone who wanted to
enforce a personal business deal, a weapon previously not freely avail-
able. Beyond welcoming all basic contract disputes, the mixed courts
created subject matter innovations such as landlord-tenant disputes,
trademark and patent infringement actions, labor striking, forgery,
misappropriation, breach of employment contracts, corporate stock
ownership, bankruptcy claims and foreclosures. These subjects corre-
sponded to new commercial transactions, whose number and value
rose in the 1900's, 1910's and 1920's in Shanghai. Speculation
boosted the value of land and population influxes inflated rents; the
introduction of tobacco and other consumer products raised the value
of brand names; the rise of industry improved the value of patents and
brought on labor strikes; the rise of the corporate form created intan-
gible wealth and limited liability; the risky commercial climate
increased the numbers of failed enterprises; and transactions with
strangers coupled with concentrations of wealth heightened the risk of
forged signatures, internal siphoning off of company funds, and
employer-employee disputes.
The courts' willingness to rely on the persuasive skill of the par-
ties and their attorneys to persuade the bench contributed to the civil
courts' accessibility. The courts followed a procedural form where
lawyers were delegated the primary task of persuasion. As conduits,
legal brokers, or middlemen, lawyers made the courts more accessible
to the Chinese merchant. Attorneys of various nationalities who had
emigrated to China founded their own local bar associations in Shang-
hai, and some were particularly skilled at petitioning judges to view
118. See, e.g., Reports of court cases, SHENBAO (China), Jan.-Dec. 1914; Court
Accountants' report, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 38 (1926).
119. FO, supra note 50, 656/160, Sept. 11, 1920 (documents relating to Tobacco Products
Corp. v. Chia Yung Chang, Sun Ching Chun, Yang Chen Sung, Zung Tso Sung, Wu Cheng
Hsu, Wong Yu Sung).
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their clients' cases favorably. At first foreign, and later Chinese, law-
yers 12 cultivated their ties with the courts and used their influence to
gain strategic advantages for their clients. After 1926, factions of Chi-
nese lawyers developed around certain judges with whom they culti-
vated ties, often based on the law school they had both attended.12 1 It
appears that the closer the relationship between the lawyer and judge,
the higher the fee the lawyer could charge. 122 Anyone could hire law-
yers, and many learned how to hire this new type of middleman from
advertisements in the daily, local newspapers. Hence, while the law-
yer's fee was a barrier to professional representation, money made
courts accessible in an important way: the preferential system meant
that a plaintiff's personal status and connections to the Chinese guild
world were not necessary for winning a favorable judgment in the
courts.
Those who founded and ran the mixed courts, whether or not
they were sensitive to the intangible costs imposed on the litigants by
Chinese culture, seem to have achieved some success in reducing
them. Traditionally in China, involvement in litigation stigmatized
120. The number of Chinese lawyers in Shanghai soared after 1926, when Chinese became
the language of all courtroom proceedings in the city, except in consular courts. Interviews
with members of the alumni association of the Shanghai College of Law and Politics, in
Shanghai (Aug. 12, 1990). The Shanghai Bar Association was located in the French
Concession. The membership of the Shanghai Bar Association, exclusively for Chinese












ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 167-69. Another source
reports a smaller membership: 462 members in 1933. ZHONGGUO ZHI CIFA [CHINA'S JUDICI-
ARY], part 2, section "benlun," at 83.
121. Graduates of the largest law school in Shanghai, the Soochow University Law School,
formed the largest faction, called the Dungwu faction. Its members dominated the Shanghai
Bar Association and had ties to many judges at the Provisional Court, including its President
Ho Shih-tseng. Graduates who had also studied in France tended to cultivate ties to Chiang
Kaishek's Nationalist government in Nanjing. They won such posts as Chief of the Ministry
of Justice and President of the Judicial Yuan. FO, supra note 50, 656/205, Mar. 24, 1930
(report on Lawyers in Shanghai Bar Association).
122. Interviews with members of the Shanghai fazheng xueyuan alumni association, in
Shanghai (Aug. 12, 1990); FO, supra note 50, 656/205, Mar. 24, 1930 (report on Lawyers in
Shanghai Bar Association); Shanghai Municipal Police files, 10 Dossiers, file 7245, statement
by Shanghai Bar Association and Shanghai Federation of College Faculties, July 19, 1926.
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both plaintiffs and defendants. According to the stereotype, courts in
China tainted the reputation of everyone involved, sometimes even
the judge. 2 3 Additionally, in early twentieth century Shanghai, given
the effectiveness of mixed court orders and judgments, there existed
an enormous potential for devastating one's opponent. Such devasta-
tion would have precluded the plaintiff from continuing a business
relationship with the defendant after trial. The toll of damaging rela-
tionships would have been particularly acute for Chinese litigants
because of their acculturation in a collusive economic environment.
Yet, while the records show that defendants frequently lost face from
litigation, I have found no instances of litigation tainting the reputa-
tion of plaintiffs. 24
D. Competition
The rise of Chinese civil courts in Shanghai is testimony to the
competitiveness of the mixed courts against traditional Chinese
courts. Local Chinese officials, merchants, and lawyers founded six-
teen civil courts between 1905 and 1933, one called the Caipansuo, or
"Place for Judicial Decisions" (1905), seven called Shenpanting, or
"Hall for Judicial Decisions" (1912-14), three under the Shanghai
District Court (1927), three under the First Special District Court
(1931), and two under the Second Special District (1933).25 Each of
the new courts employed the civil-criminal distinction, permitted the
use of lawyers, and attempted to garner support from a professional
police force-all features introduced to Shanghai by the mixed courts.
The hybrid character of the mixed courts and the multi-national char-
acter of Shanghai may have eased the transplantability of these alien
legal concepts.
123. William Alford, Of Arsenic and Old Laws: The Criminal Process in Late Imperial
China, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1180, 1222-26 (1984).
124. When a debt suit was filed against compradore Nye Tah Cheong, his British
employer's business suffered because customers lost confidence. See FO, supra note 50, 656/
118, Oct. 27, 1909 (letter from W.T. Garnett & Co. to British judge regarding the case Yang
Tsin Zung v. Nye Tab Cheong). A Chinese manager of a general store, Teng Shien-son, could
not find work for at least seven months because of a suit pending against him in the
International Mixed Court. Id. 656/124, Aug. 4, 1910 (letter from Teng Shien-son to British
Consul General).
125. In the rushed preparations for the court's official transfer to Chinese control on
January 1, 1927, the warlord in control of Shanghai's region and the regional official in charge
of the city of Nanjing, which would soon be the nation's capital, made judicial appointments to
the Court their first priority. Local lawyers exerted great influence on the appointment of
judges. Telegram from Nanjing Viceroy Xu and General Sun Chuanfang to Longhua Chief
Executive Ding (Dec. 1926) (on file at the Shanghai Municipal Archives, file 179.4.6); FO,
supra note 50, 656/205, Mar. 24, 1930 (Shanghai Bar Association Report); id. (report on the
Provisional Court labelled "secret and confidential").
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An experimental local Chinese council set up a court called the
Caipansuo to try both criminal and civil cases arising in the Chinese
sections of Shanghai. The council funded the Caipansuo and staffed it
with locally-elected judges for seven years before dissolving it.
Between 1905 and 1912, the Caipansuo heard slightly over 1,700 cases
a year.' 2 6 It may have been the first Chinese court in Shanghai to use
the term "civil."
Between 1912 and 1914, a new Chinese municipal government
for Shanghai, the Huigongyi, set up seven German-style courts and
called them Shenpanting, a derivation from a new Japanese name for
court.' 27 The Shenpanting were meant to be more specialized and
western than their predecessor, the traditional yamen court, which
had served as the official imperial quarters of the local district magis-
trate. Each Shenpanting had both a civil and a criminal section.
They allowed lawyers to argue on behalf of parties, and they made
litigation more available by each serving separate Chinese districts of
the city. The local district magistrate initially adjudicated cases in his
yamen. After the fall of China's Emperor, the office of the magistrate
continued, but the founding of the Shenpanting in 1912, which was a
court meant to replace many of the judicial functions of the magis-
trate, signaled that the yamen was unsuccessful at competing with the
western-style courts.'
28
In 1927, the Shanghai District Court (Shanghai difang fayuan)
replaced the Shenpanting and went on to operate until 1941, despite
the Japanese take-over of its courthouse in 1937. The court devoted a
permanent and full-time staff to the administration of its civil section.
Out of a total staff of 115 for the entire district court, including
judges, fourteen employees worked solely in the civil section. Their
most important task was managing the security deposits and the
126. SHANGHAISHI ZIZHIZHI [SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL SELF-GOVERNMENT RECORDS],
"Fanli" [explanation] section, at lb-2a; id. "Shanghaishi zizhi kuaiji biao" [Shanghai
Municipal Records Statistics Table] section, at 5a, 6a [hereinafter SELF-GOVERNMENT].
127. Interviews with members of the Shanghai College of Law and Politics Alumni
Association, in Shanghai (Aug. 12, 1990).
128. Note, though, that a national regulation revised in 1923 still referred to magistrates'
courts. Revised Provisional Regulations Governing Trial Proceedings by a Magistrate
(promulgated Mar. 30, 1923). From 1910 until at least 1927, magistrates were allowed to try
first instance criminal cases and civil cases involving 800 yuan or less, plus all suits involving
litigants with special economic relationships, such as landlord-tenant, master-servant,
innkeeper-customer, and carrier-customer suits. THE CHINA YEARBOOK (1926-27) 760-61
(1927).
The jurisdictional separation between the yamen and the Shenpanting is unclear, because
the Shenpanting performed the judicial functions of the yamen court, and, like the yamen, was
bound to follow national substantive and procedural laws and was under the authority of the
Ministry of Justice.
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assets of litigants.129
Caseloads in Shanghai reflected the success of courts at meeting
the demand for litigation services because litigants were fairly free to
choose between the traditional courts and the new courts. All the
Chinese and mixed courts of Shanghai were available as fora for
resolving disputes between Chinese who lived anywhere in the city.
The bilateral treaties signed by the imperial Chinese government and
thirteen foreign nations in the 1840s through the 1860s, left open the
question of personal jurisdiction in civil cases. However, the mixed
courts were so effective at competing with the Chinese courts that
Chinese who lived in the foreign areas of Shanghai brought their suits
to the mixed courts. Under the mixed courts' tacit minimal contacts
rules, anyone was permitted to bring to the mixed courts suits against
any Chinese who resided in, visited, had assets in, or did business in
the territories over which the mixed courts had jurisdiction. The
International Mixed Court had territorial jurisdiction over the Inter-
national Settlement, the district of Shanghai controlled by the British
Municipal Police, and the French Mixed Court exercised jurisdiction
over the French Concession.
Over ninety-five percent of the residents of those districts were
Chinese, and these districts covered the financial district and some of
the busiest commercial areas of the city. Movement of the local popu-
lation across these districts was the shortest route between the Chi-
nese sections of the city and was frequent enough to undermine the
ability of any minimal contacts rule to mandate the choice of civil
court. The Chinese courts, including the traditional-style Chinese
court in the district of Nanshi, ruled out any suits against any Chinese
as long as their place of business or residence was Shanghai. Conse-
quently, jurisdictional distinctions did not clearly dictate where Chi-
nese had to take their lawsuits, and Chinese litigants could vote with
their feet. Caseloads reflected, if imperfectly, popularity. 130
As a sign of the freedom to choose one's court, forum shopping
was a perennial problem. Though data is scarce, the civil dockets of
129. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 4-6, 12-13.
130. In the district court located in the Chinese section of Nanshi and in the successor
courts to both mixed courts, Chinese sued Chinese, Chinese sued foreigners, foreigners sued
Chinese, and foreigners sued foreigners. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22,
Judicial section, at 39-41, 59-67, 105-106. This meant that the courts located in foreign
sections of the city did not have exclusive jurisdiction over suits involving foreigners. Case
records also show that Chinese at times took the same dispute to different courts in the city.
For example, the mixed-court case of merchants Cheng Gongyuan v. Cheng Xiuming, where
one half-brother accused the half-brother who was head of the family of misappropriating the
family jade pieces, was tried in the Shenpanting five years earlier. Special District Court,
criminal case no. 174, appeal rejected Mar. 30, 1931, JIANGSU, at 193-96.
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Chinese courts before 1927 appear to have been smaller than those of
the International and French Mixed Courts. What proportion of the
1,700 annual cases at the Caipansuo were civil is unknown; however,
we do know that a lone individual, an assistant judge, handled all the
civil litigation in the space of only two hours per day. 3 1
The smaller civil caseloads of the Chinese courts leads to several
possible conclusions, any or all of which are plausible either singly or
in combination. First, the courts did not enforce their judgments, nor
did they maintain exclusive jurisdiction over property, assets, and
people within their territories. Second, the Chinese courts did not
offer the popular types of suits that reduced the risk of nonenforce-
ment of the bargains made by the merchants of Shanghai. Third,
their procedures and outcomes did not favor plaintiffs or the costs to
plaintiffs were high. Finally, administrative burdens pressured the
people who ran the courts into accepting fewer cases.
The absence of all of these factors in the mixed courts gave them
advantages over their Chinese competitors. First, their lack of power
to enforce judgments made the yamen, the Caipansuo and the
Shenpanting less attractive fora for enforcing agreements. Even the
Caipansuo and the Shenpanting, while relying on the parties to pres-
ent the facts of the dispute, also relied on the parties to enforce the
judgment. Police assistance was generally unavailable in civil cases
there.
The enforceability of court decrees was so crucial that as the Chi-
nese courts were founded, several local Chinese police forces devel-
oped and worked in tandem with their criminal sides, but less so with
their civil sides. Large, professional police forces were an unprece-
dented phenomenon in China.'32 A local militia called the River
Police enforced the criminal decisions of the Caipansuo. The
prosecutorial departments attached to the criminal section of the
Shenpanting may have provided some investigation services to its civil
side. There surely was a demand for it. 133 The Shanghai Public
131. SHANGHAISHI ZIZHIZHI, "Gongdu shenbian" [publication of official documents]
section, "Jingzheng'an" [Police and government] subsection, 53-54.
132. See SHANGHAI TONGJI ZONG BAOGAO [SHANGHAI STATISTICS GENERAL REPORT],
(Shanghaishi zhengfu tongji chubianyin [Compiled and published by Shanghai Municipal
Government Statistics], 1946), statistical tables chapter 7, "Jingbao" [police security] section,
at 1-62.
133. In 1915, the Ministry of Justice revised and repromulgated an edict of the Guangxu
Emperor, parts of which laid out how courts were to try civil cases. In only general terms, the
document permitted government enforcement of civil court judgments. Articles 78 to 80
provided for detention of civil debtors. Article 41 provided that, if a civil party did not
voluntarily comply with an adverse judgment, his assets could be seized and sold to satisfy the
judgment. If the assets were not sufficient, the rule specified, the judgment debtor could be
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Security Bureau, a quasi-military force of Chinese that adopted many
of the procedures of the Shanghai Municipal Police, enforced the
decisions of the Shanghai District Court. 3 4 Still, the district court's
orders and judgments were not enforced as efficiently as those of the
mixed courts. The Chinese Public Security Bureau did not automati-
cally enforce the district court's orders for debt payment. Plaintiffs
first had to apply for a special judgment authorizing the use of force
to implement the order. The Chinese District Court granted enforce-
ment orders under the authority of a national statute. 135 It used sum-
monses to bring defendants into court, but armed police officers did
not serve them. If a civil defendant was difficult to locate and sum-
mon into court, the plaintiff had to petition the court to appoint a
lawyer who would publicly summon the defendant.'
3 6
The lack of police backing also placed the Chinese courts at a
competitive disadvantage when asserting their jurisdiction. The Chi-
nese personnel at the court in Nanshi cooperated with the Interna-
tional Mixed Court, while the Mixed Court's police and judges were
reluctant to cooperate with Chinese courts. To handle cases involving
people, acts, and property outside the narrow confines of the Interna-
tional Settlement, the Mixed Court needed to arrest and summon
defendants a7 and witnesses, and obtain information from Chinese
forced to work while in detention until he produced the amount of the judgment. Reglement
Provisoire Pour Les Tribuneaux Superieurs et Ceux Qui Leur Sont Subordonn6s de la
Republique Chinoise [Provisional Regulations for High Courts and the Courts Subject to the
Authority of the Chinese Republic] (Law Codification Commission, trans.) (Ministry of
Justice 1915), "1915 Procedure Rules." The central government in 1921 issued a regulation
forbidding District Magistrates to call on the prosecutorial units of the Shenpanting to process
civil cases. GUOMIN ZHENGFU [REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT], SIFA LIGUI [JUDICIAL LAWS
AND REGULATIONS] (Republican Government Judicial Yuan Councilor's office, comps., Feb.
1930), at 1792, Article 5.
134. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 13. Many of these
procedures used cutting-edge technology, for example fingerprinting, for identification.
Frederick Wakeman, Policing Modern Shanghai, 115 CHINA Q. 408, 427 (Sept. 1988). See,
e.g., Fingerprinted criminal record of Li Kungpao, native of Changchow, age 35, Shanghai
Municipal Police doc. no. 23358, Shanghai Municipal Archives.
135. RENMIN SUSONG TIAOLI [CIVIL PROCEDURE REGULATION], ORD. 600, PROVISION
6, ARTICLE 1. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 20, 1928 (Huang Jimao), JIANGSU, supra note 45,
at 309; Judgment of Dec. 13, 1928 (Wang Gongquan), JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 311.
136. This procedure is described in the RENMIN SUSONG TIAOLI, provision 182. E.g.,
Judgment of Feb. 15, 1929 (Han Zhuanghe), JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 313; Judgment of Apr.
30, 1929 (Xie Chaoshi), JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 317; Judgment of Feb. 18, 1929 (Jin
Hanchen), JIANGSU, at 315.
137. See FO, supra note 50, 656/124, Sept. 8, 1910, Oct. 1, 1910, Oct. 12, 1910 (letters from
S. Houston McKean to British judge Garstin regarding the case Horatio Robertson v. Yeh Vee
Sung, asking for the arrest of Yeh Vee Sung, who was in the Nanshi yamen). Id. 656/137, Jan.
8, 1915. Under considerable pressure, the British judge at the Mixed Court finally asked the
Shanghai Circuit Intendant to arrange for Yeh to be delivered to the Mixed Court for trial.
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authorities. Local Chinese authorities helped the Mixed Court
impound assets outside the Settlement and deport people out of the
city.'a8 Yet, the Mixed Court never reciprocated and vigorously tried
to maintain a monopoly over the first-instance adjudication of matters
arising within its territorial jurisdiction. The Municipal Police aimed
to exercise exclusive control over all Chinese living in the Settlement,
even the political revolutionaries seeking the protection that the Brit-
ish control afforded from Chinese government censure. In the famous
Subao case, the Emperor himself had to arrange for the Municipal
Police to try on his behalf the anti-Manchu activist Zou Rong in the
Mixed Court rather than in the Nanshi court, the local extension of
the Emperor's national court system. 139  The International Settle-
ment's authorities insisted on first trying all Chinese wanted by Chi-
nese authorities in the International Mixed Court for acts committed
outside the Settlement." The Mixed Court also insisted on con-
ducting a judicial proceeding if local Chinese officials wanted to
attach Chinese property within the Settlement. 4 ' The court's unwill-
ingness to relinquish judicial authority over all people and assets
within the International Settlement precluded Chinese courts from lit-
igating claims arising in the settlement.
Subject matter jurisdiction formed a second competitive disad-
vantage of the Chinese courts. The civil process they offered appealed
to Chinese merchants less than the actions available in the mixed
138. Except for a period of recalcitrance between 1911 and 1914, the district magistrate and
the Circuit Intendant in Shanghai generally allowed Mixed Court runners and Municipal
Police officers into Nanshi. Alternatively, they let their own staff carry out Mixed Court
orders and seal up premises, or actually hand over Chinese suspects to the Court. FO, supra
note 50, 656/118, Oct. 25, 1909 (letter from Burkhill & Sons to British judge regarding a
Chinese shopkeeper in Nanshi whom Burkhill sued and against whom he won an order to seal
a shop); id. 656/131, Jan. 16, 1913 (letter from one Mellows to Captain Myhre, Harbour
Master, regarding Chinese defendant arrested by Nanshi police); id. 656/133, May 19, 1914
(letter from Houston McKean to British judge Garstin regarding Austrian Export & Import
Co. v. Tien Yue Piece Goods Hong); id. 656/133, May 12, 1916 (letter from Mixed Court
Registrar to British judge Hones regarding Algar v. Tsang Sau Ding).
139. The romanticization used in the English language version of the transcript is "Tsou
Yung." The Shanghai Sedition Trial: Popularly Known as the Supao Case, Heard in the Mixed
Court of Shanghai On December 3, 4, 5, 7 & 16, 1903, reprinted in SHANGHAI: N.-CHINA
HERALD 1904, at 1-41 (available at the British Library in the British Museum, London).
140. FO, supra note 50, 656/131, May 8, 1913; id. 656/118, Mar. 2, 1909 (reporting
Municipal Police Colonel Bruce's statement to the Shanghai Circuit Intendant that "the arrest
of criminals in the Settlement was a matter for the Settlement Police and that if outside
detectives came to arrest people in the Settlement, they would themselves be arrested").
141. Eg., FO, supra note 50, 656/137, July 1 and 3, 1915 (letters exchanged between Mixed
Court Registrar and British judge, indicating that, in 1915, the Zhejiang Salt Commissioner
sought to impound 356,317 piculs of salt that the commissioner's agent Li Yung Feng had
stored in the Settlement; Li owed the Commissioner $56,000 in dues for being granted a
monopoly over salt in the Settlement).
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courts. It does not appear that the yamen, Caipansuo, and Shenpant-
ing offered the variety of commercial actions the mixed courts did.
The types of cases transferred from court to court are evidence of a
division of labor between the Shenpanting and the International
Mixed Court. In 1914, for example, the Mixed Court sent twenty-two
cases to the Shenpanting, most of them criminal. Conversely, the
Shenpanting sent two cases to the Mixed Court, a debt suit and a
copyright suit. 142
In the same vein, the local Shanghai court run in a yamen by the
central Chinese government could not compete with the Mixed Court
for land litigation, even though land disputes proliferated, and even
though foreign control of land in Shanghai was an affront to Chinese
sovereignty and thus to the sensibilities of Chinese plaintiffs. Chinese
bringing land suits in the mixed courts were considered unpatriotic
because doing so gave a foreign judge power over the disposition of
the land. Through a variety of agreements, authorities in China per-
mitted foreigners to dwell on and use areas of land in what amounted
to an elaborate system of leaseholds. The fiction of Chinese sover-
eignty was maintained while foreigners exercised control over city
land.'43 Despite the stigma, however, Chinese landowners in Shang-
hai showed a great desire to assert their rights in the mixed courts.
While the new Chinese civil courts in Shanghai adjudicated land
actions, the territorial jurisdiction of the mixed courts covered the
most industrious financial and commercial districts of Shanghai, and
the mixed courts maintained an exclusive power to settle land dis-
putes there. Nor could Shanghai's local merchant organizations pro-
vide the service of dispute resolution in land cases because the local
Chinese and foreign governments in the city created a system of land
registration that nullified the merchants' authority. 44
Imitation suggests that what was imitated worked. When Chi-
nese administrators took over the mixed courts and turned them into
the First and Second Special District Courts, they formalized the vari-
ety and innovation of the civil subject matter jurisdiction. The regis-
trars broke down caseload statistics by type of suit, and judges handed
142. See generally reports of court cases, SHENBAO (China), Jan.-Dec. 1914.
143. The system originated in the 1845 version of the Land Regulations (Tudi zhangcheng),
text in SHANGHAI GONGGONG ZUJIE ZHIDU, (Zhongguo kexue gongsi chengyin, 1931), at 200-
13 (China Science Company pub.) [hereinafter Tudi zhangcheng]. For a good summary of the
official mechanisms for foreign possession of land in Shanghai, see Anatol Kotenev, Shanghai:
Transfer of Title to Land in the International Settlement (1931) (unpublished manuscript,
prepared for the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council, available at the University of
Hong Kong Library). See generally V.A. RIASANOVSKY, THE MODERN CIVIL LAW OF
CHINA, PART 1, at 44 (1928).
144. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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down judgments noting the type of suit. I45 The divisions created
ready-made lawsuit categories that, in effect, advertised the set of
merchants' rights enforceable in the courts. This smorgasbord of civil
actions heightened plaintiffs' awareness and may have stimulated the
desire to litigate. At the same time, the wide variety of permissible
types of suits did not screen out any disputes. The district court's
expanded subject matter jurisdiction included family disputes, small
commercial cases, land disputes, trademark infringement, building
cases, maritime cases, securities, labor strikes, sale of goods and the
lucrative suits for recovery of rent by landlords and for the transfer of
defaulting mortgagors' assets to mortgagees. 146
A third competitive disadvantage of the Chinese courts was that
they did not follow a procedure favorable to the plaintiff.'4 7 A pro-
plaintiff procedure was alien to China. Confucius touted the notion of
avoidance. Under this view, the best judicial work was preventative;
the idea was to help people solve their problems among themselves
and thereby keep them from seeking a judicial resolution. China's
emperors subscribed to this notion in every dynasty. 148 In order to
keep dockets small and government costs down, China's imperial rul-
ers encouraged the imperial bureaucracy to promote a forbidding
image of the national court system. The Emperor Kangxi wrote in
the early Qing period:
The Emperor, considering... the notoriously litigious character of
the Chinese, is of the opinion that lawsuits would tend to increase
to a frightful extent if people were not afraid of the tribunals and if
they felt confident of always finding in them ready and perfect jus-
tice.... The good citizens who may have difficulties among them-
selves should settle them like brothers by referring to the
arbitration of some old man or village head. As for those who are
troublesome, obstinate and quarrelsome, let them be ruined in the
law courts; that is the justice that is due to them.
The Emperor Kangxi, 1661-1722.149
145. See ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 15.
146. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 34-93. E.g.,
Judgment of Dec. 19, 1928 (Da Kangyang v. Wu Yanwei), JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 265-68.
147. See generally THE CHINA YEARBOOK, 1912-27.
148. Many thanks to Chang Wejen for educating me about court procedure in imperial
China.
149. The Geography of China, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG., vol. LI, no. 6 (June 1927).
Many thanks to the Honorable James Buckley for alerting me to this edict.
The lesson of Kangxi's edict and the great strength of guilds in Qing China support the
notion that court authority over commercial disputes keeps barriers to market participation
low. In eighteenth and nineteenth century China, collusive business practices grew in the
absence of judicial dispute settlement mechanisms for commercial disputes. Perhaps, further
research on courts and guilds in the Qing period will show that the courts' abdication of a
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The magistrates who served as first instance judges often reached
judgment based solely on the petition. Even if the plaintiff's claim
survived to the hearing stage, the law prohibited the plaintiff from
marshalling any legal resources to his aid. The imperial law code con-
tained provisions prohibiting certain types of people from serving as
representatives for plaintiffs, including government school students
and professional specialists in court procedure. Nor was the plaintiff
permitted to advance legal arguments at the hearing. Instead, he was
limited to presenting facts only. For some claimants, the law prohib-
ited the filing of petitions under any circumstances; this group of
claimants included government officials, government school students,
prisoners, children (if their complaint was against their parents or
grandparents), and junior relatives (if their complaint was against rel-
atives senior to them).
150
In 1915, the national government promulgated civil procedure
rules that provided for legal representation, prescribed the contents of
the civil petition, and fixed costs on a sliding scale according to the
amount in dispute. The higher the amount, the lower the percentage
of the fee. The percentage ranged from about three to five percent."1 '
It is unclear to what extent these rules actually dictated practices at
the Shenpanting in Shanghai, but the rules officially would have
bound the Shenpanting.
Mimicking the pro-plaintiff mixed courts, the Chinese District
Court adopted procedures benefitting plaintiffs. Its services, such as
orders to pay, injunctions urging the timely completion of a task, and
declarations of death, bankruptcy, and incompetency to manage one's
property, reduced risk and costs for property owners, employers, and
creditors.1 2 Plaintiffs or their lawyers could petition the district
court for orders that would be granted summarily and carried out
without evidentiary hearing for the defendant, and orders for the
arrest and detention of defendants who did not pay court judg-
ments.'53 The district court granted sealing and auction orders
significant role in adjudicating merchant disputes shifted enough power to guilds to allow them
to maintain barriers to market formation.
150. See ZHONGYANG YANJINYUAN [AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHINESE
LEGAL HISTORY], roll 39 at 1004, roll 40 at 1013, 1018, 1025.
151. 1915 Procedure Rules, Articles 48, 51, 84-96.
152. With the exception of prosecution for tax evasion, pursued solely at the First Special
District Court, the three largest courts of Shanghai after 1927 had identical subject matter
jurisdictions. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 35, 41.
153. See, e.g., Judgment of Dec. 13, 1928 (Zhou Decui v. Yin Huairen), JIANGSU, supra
note 45, at 289; Judgment of Apr. 6, 1929 (Zhang Yuling), id. at 287.
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almost identical to those used at the International Mixed Court. 54
After the mixed courts came under Chinese control, they continued to
be accessible. They even encouraged small suits by reserving special
courtrooms for simple civil suits, as did the Chinese District Court.'"
The size of commercial cases processed at each of the three courts
varied greatly because the courts imposed no jurisdictional floor or
ceiling on the amount in dispute.
156
A fourth disadvantage of the Chinese courts was their cost to
litigators. In monetary and psychological terms, Chinese courts tradi-
tionally placed substantial costs on plaintiffs in order to discourage
litigation. Plaintiffs often had to travel long distances to file petitions.
Petitions had to be filed at the yamen, of which there was only one per
county. If a lower ranking, and therefore more ubiquitous and acces-
sible, government official tried any lawsuit himself, not only he, but
also his immediate superior and his superior's superiors were subject
to demerits, demotions, or other punishment.
Petitions had to be in writing and contain certain items of infor-
mation, such as the names of the people involved in the dispute, and
at least several lines clearly describing the facts of the dispute.
Although the penalty for failure to meet these pleading requirements
was dismissal, the law forbade complainants from hiring professionals
or even students of government to write the complaints. By law, mag-
istrates could punish plaintiffs who brought accusations in petitions
that later proved to be false. If someone else wrote the petition for the
plaintiff, the scrivener could also be punished.
157
Although the mixed courts did not impose these kinds of burdens
and restrictions on plaintiffs, the mixed courts did impose one cost on
Chinese plaintiffs that the Chinese courts did not. Atop the ancient
stigma attached to courts in general was the evil of foreigners sitting
as judges. Potential Chinese plaintiffs were concerned about the
nationality of judges, not only because it affected the outcome of judi-
154. Judgment of Jan. 26, 1929 (Zhang Wenqing), id. at 295; Judgment of Dec. 17, 1928
(Jiang Shixiong), id. at 297; Judgment of Apr. 12, 1929 (Chen Fengshi), id. at 293.
155. The First Special District Court was the Chinese incarnation of the International
Mixed Court. The litigation classed as "civil" in the International Mixed Court's official
figures involved almost exclusively commercial disputes. See ANNUAL MIRROR OF
SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 15.
156. The Shanghai District Court, the First Special District Court, and the Second Special
District Court all heard debt cases involving less than 200 yuan. In 1935, the District Court
heard 2591 such cases. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at
41, 107.
157. See generally ZHONGYANG YANJINYUAN (AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY], supra note 150, at 981-91, roll 39.
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cial decisions, but also because it further stigmatized Chinese who
submitted to the authority of a foreigner.
The Chinese who took control of the mixed civil courts in Shang-
hai removed foreign judges, who represented a serious cultural obsta-
cle to Chinese use of the courts. In 1927, when the Caipansuo became
the District Court of Shanghai, they removed all foreign judges from
the International Mixed Court,'58 and later in 1930, all foreign advi-
sors to the bench. By 1931, all French judges had left the bench of the
French Mixed Court. In all three courts, then, Chinese judges offi-
cially applied national civil statutes. 5 9 Patriotism no longer stood as
a barrier to the use of the Chinese courts located in the foreign
settlements.
These changes signalled the progressive incorporation of Shang-
hai's three major courts, first into a local, and then into a national
Chinese court system. They coincided with, and may have precipi-
tated, a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese civil suits liti-
gated in all three courts.
158. The International Mixed Court was named the "Provisional Court" in 1927, the
"Special District Court" in 1930, and the "First Special District Court" in 1931.
159. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 12.
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TABLE II - CIVIL CASES IN SHANGHAI DISTRICT COURTS16°
District1 6 1  First Special District
16 2  Second Special District
16 3
Cases Accepted Cases Accepted Cases Accepted
for Total Cases for Total Cases for Total Cases
First Hearing Accepted* First Hearing Accepted* First Hearing Accepted*
1931 2,613 5,971 4,036 8,829 1,672 3,586
1932
1933 4,400 10,809 6,426 14,140 2,914 5,925
1934 5,550 13,438 8,896 17,891 3,515 7,071
1935 8,962 18,001 15,172 28,365 5,575 10,146
1946 9,233 NA NA NA NA
1947 17,284 NA NA NA NA
1948 12,186 26,471 NA NA NA NA
*Includes Chinese civil cases accepted for first hearing, first rehearing, second rehearing, rehearing for
setting aside the ruling, new trial, petitions for injunctions, writ of mandamus, and compulsory execution.
Any cases in which parties filed for more than one of these in the same year would have been counted more
than once.
The sixteen-fold increase in the total number of civil cases
accepted at the First Special District Court between 1926 and 1935164
far outpaced population growth and so may have been in part a
response to the removal of foreign judges. Their removal diminished
the stigma borne by the court and thereby lowered the cost to Chinese
of litigating there. Of the First Special District Court civil cases,
160. Figures for 1943 through 1944 are lacking, presumably as a result of a general halting
of court work during the Japanese occupation of Shanghai. After 1944, the two Special
District Courts merged into the Shanghai District Court. Figures for 1945 are available only
for criminal cases. See ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, 1946, Judicial section, at 3-5.
161. STATISTICS OF SHANGHAI, supra note 12, Judicial Section, Table 5, at 3; ANNUAL
MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, 1934, Judicial section, at 17; 1936 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13, Table
5, at 19; ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, at 34-36; ANNUAL MIRROR OF
SHANGHAI, 1946, Judicial Section, at 3-5; ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, 1947, Judicial
Section, at 6-8; SHANGHAISHI TONGJI ZONG BAOGAO [GENERAL STATISTICS REPORT OF THE
SHANGHAI MUNICIPALITY], 1948, Judicial Section, Tables 324, 326 (Shanghai Municipal
Archives, file 1-0-193). The figures for 1933 refer to cases accepted between July 1933 and
June 1934. The figures for 1934 refer to cases accepted between July 1934 and June 1935.
162. STATISTICS OF SHANGHAI, supra note 12, Judicial Section, Table 5, at 3; 1936
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13, Table 5, at 19; ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22,
at 56-67; ANNUAL REPORT, 1941, supra note 64, at 35-36; ANNUAL REPORT, 1942, at 45.
163. STATISTICS OF SHANGHAI, supra note 12, Judicial Section, Table 5, at 3; 1936
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 13, Table 5, at 19; ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22,
at 103-07.
164. The total figure for Chinese civil cases filed in 1926 was 1,793. See TABLE I, supra text
accompanying notes 64-67.
Each civil case accepted at the First Special District Court involved the service of roughly
15 summonses, orders, and other civil processes on average. The following are the figures for
total number of "Civil Processes Served" from that court from January of 1933 through
December of 1941.
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almost all involved Chinese suing Chinese. 165
The three courts operated nine civil courtrooms and together
with the appeals courts they processed more civil cases annually than
their predecessors. Their total civil caseload increased each year,
interrupted only by the Japanese occupation. Growth finally stopped
only when the Chinese Communist Party took over Shanghai in
1949.166
The relatively small civil caseloads of the Chinese courts before
the procedural reforms beginning in 1927 reflected not just a less
favorable civil process there, but also an inadequate dedication of
judicial resources. The number of civil cases processed at the Caipan-
suo probably would have been larger if the court had devoted more
time to them. The Caipansuo had trouble handling its civil docket,
even after the provincial official deputized the International Mixed
Court to try some of its civil cases.
167












165. FO, supra note 50, 656/205, July 1930 (Municipal Advocate's Report); FEITANG
FAGUAN YANJIU SHANGHAI GONGGONG ZUJIE QINGXING BAOGAOSHU [REPORT OF STUDY
BY THE OFFICIAL FEI TANG OF THE SITUATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT],
(Gongbuju huawenchu yishu [Municipal Council Chinese Dept.], 1931), vol. 1, at 411. In
1935, 417 out of 18,001 District Court cases involved at least one foreign party, as did 2,911
out of 28,365 First Special District Court cases, and 175 out of 10,146 Second Special District
Court cases. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, at 36-55, 67-102, 107-16.
166. The French and International courts after 1927 received roughly the same proportion
of the total caseload received as mixed courts before 1927. The French court processed about
40% of the International court's civil caseload before 1927. See supra note 71. From July,
1931 to June, 1932, the three courts together processed 18,386 first instance cases. The
District Court, successor to the Shenpanting, handled 32% of these cases in 1931-1932. The
First Special District Court, successor to the International court, handled 48%, and the
Second Special District Court, successor to the French court, handled 20%. Calculated from
figures in SHANGHAISHi TONGJI [STATISTICS OF SHANGHAI], "Sifa" [udicial administration]
section, table 5. In 1935, the three courts handled a total of 26,964 cases. The District Court
handled 30% of the total. "Financial" cases accounted for 84% at the First Special District
Court, for 83% at the successor to the Second Special District Court, and for 63% at the
District Court. ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 34-37, 55-
57, 103-16.
167. SHANGHAISHI ZIZHIZHI, "Gongdu shenbian" [publication of official documents]
section, "Jingzheng'an" [Police and government] subsection, 53-54.
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attractive to Chinese civil plaintiffs, the courts suffered under new
administrative burdens after 1927. China's new ruler, Chiang
Kaishek, created a Ministry of Justice in his capital of Nanjing in
November 1926, one of whose functions was to unite all existing
courts in China into a single, uniform court system. The Ministry
charged the clerks and judges at the Shanghai District Court with
onerous administrative tasks for each civil case. Dozens of new inter-
nal regulations required detailed reports and recordkeeping. Judges
were bound to pay scrupulous attention to substantive rules emanat-
ing from the Ministry and from its executive arm after October 1928,
the Judicial Administration Bureau.
168
As part of Chiang Kaishek's attempt to incorporate the Shanghai
courts into the national court system, national bureaucrats in Nanj-
ing, more concerned with increasing state revenues and legal uniform-
ity across China than with encouraging litigation, tried to minimize
the local autonomy of the former mixed courts and reduce their pro-
plaintiff bias. The Judicial Administration Bureau of Chiang's
national regime in Nanjing attempted to narrow the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Shanghai courts by allocating jurisdiction for some
of the courts' types of suits into government administrative depart-
ments. Each department specialized in a different subject matter that
corresponded to a type of dispute formerly tried in the International
Mixed Court.I69 The plan was to shift the task of enforcing local gov-
ernment regulations from the former mixed courts to local adminis-
trative departments.
170
The plan failed, despite much bureaucratic effort. One of the
departments processed cases of land disputes 71 while the courts con-
tinued to try them. Likewise, the courts continued to entertain labor
168. Sifa xingzhengbu daishu zhibian [The development of the chain of command over the
Judicial Administration Bureau], at 1, in ZHANSHI SIFA JIYAO [AN OUTLINE OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIARY].
169. Shanghai Municipal Archives, file 181.1.19. See especially chart at 92, outlining each
district level department.
170. For example, the Bureau of Social Affairs was set up under the City Government of
Greater Shanghai. One of its principal functions was to keep track of and diffuse labor unrest.
See SHANGHAI BUREAU OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, J1N SHIWUNIANLAI SHANGHAI ZHI
TAIGONGTINGYE [STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN SHANGHAI SINCE 1918] (1933); SHANGHAI
BUREAU OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT ON LABOR STRIKES IN GREATER SHANGHAI
(Yearbook) (1928); SHANGHAI BUREAU OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SHANGHAI TEBIESHI
TAIGONGTINGYE TONGJI [THE SPECIAL MUNICIPALITY OF SHANGHAI STRIKES AND
LOCKOUT STATISTICS] (1929).
171. For a summary of disputes handled by the Land Administration Office, see
SHANGHAISHI TONGJI ZONG BAOGAO [SHANGHAI STATISTICS, GENERAL REPORT], 1946,
Chapter 2, Dizheng [land administration] section, at 8, table 6.
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cases while another department mediated labor disputes. 172 Chinese
litigation of family disputes continued through 1941 despite the crea-
tion of mediation procedures in all three courts for "human relations"
cases and for commercial cases.
73
On the whole, the central government's efforts did not diminish
the number of civil cases brought to the Shanghai courts. The civil
courts under Chinese control after 1927 tried more civil disputes than
the mixed civil courts ever did. The First Special District Court
processed multiples more cases than the International Mixed Court
did during even its busiest days in the mid-1920s.174  Yet, the new
administrative burdens indirectly impaired the courts' accessibility by
giving court personnel incentives to minimize caseloads. Corruption
raised costs as well. National bureaucrats, who ranked above the
local judges, had trouble preventing the judges from accepting fees
directly from the parties.
75
Guilds and government arbitration tribunals tried to compete
with the courts, but none of them offered as attractive a dispute reso-
lution mechanism as the courts. The commercial arbitration tribunals
established by the Ministry of Justice in the early 1920s did not cater
to plaintiffs to the extent of the courts. The tribunals were not permit-
ted to award default judgments.176 The tribunals were also restrained
from compelling any action by the parties, and so could not assure the
172. See the enumeration of strike cases for 1935, id. at 35.
173. All three Chinese courts offered mediation after 1927. See id. at 68-69, 108-09 (yearly
mediation statistics).
Case records show that mediation was rarely effective for commercial cases. For example,
First Special District Court civil case no. 1888 underwent mediation in 1935, then resorted to
litigation between 1936 and 1942. File 190/4003 Shanghai Municipal Archives. Another case
went to trial at the First Special District Court after undergoing mediation procedures there.
Recorded in Minshi tiaojie zhuanpiao, Jiangsu Shanghai yitequ difangfating, [petition for civil
mediation in the Jiangsu Shanghai First Special District local court], file 190/3998, Shanghai
Municipal Archives.
These courtroom mediation procedures may have been modelled after an earlier effort by
the Chinese national government to draw commercial disputes out of the courts by establishing
"arbitration courts." Shangshi gongduanchu zhangcheng [regulations of the arbitration court
of the Chinese republic], promulgated Jan. 28, 1913, by the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (Cifabu [Ministry of Justice], at the Ecole des Hautes
Etudes des Sciences Sociales, Paris [hereinafter Arbitration Court Regulations]).
174. The criminal side of the court grew from 4,466 successful prosecutions of Chinese in
the Mixed Court in 1872 (April 1872 to March 1873) to 124,215 prosecutions (including
appeals) in the First Special District Court in 1941. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at
51, 54 (1872); id. at 35-36 (1941).
175. Hence, the Judicial Yuan issued in 1929 a directive to the High Court of the neighbor
Zhejiang province that explained a new civil procedure regulation restricting the secret
acceptance of litigant fees. GUOMIN ZHENGFU, supra note 133, at 1793.
176. Arbitration Court Regulations, supra note 173, ch. V, art. 26.
1374
COURTS OF SHANGHAI
same enforcement guarantees the courts offered. 77 Because the tribu-
nals were attached to the Shanghai Chinese General Chamber of
Commerce (Zongshanghui), a non-governmental organization, the
government's reluctance to delegate the use of force to the tribunal is
understandable. The close association of the Chinese Chamber of
Commerce with the tribunals also raised the specter of the Chamber
influencing arbitrator selection. This shortcoming, together with the
fact that the arbitrators were not accountable to any public authority,
exposed the parties to the same pressures to settle disagreements that
existed in the guilds.
I7 1
Guilds and merchant associations in Shanghai continued to offer
traditional mediation for disputes among their members. 17 9 It is
unclear how much dispute-settling business the courts took from the
guilds and other non-court fora. Without more information about
what was happening to dispute management in merchant organiza-
tions in Shanghai, we cannot know the extent to which the court's
alternative replaced other dispute resolving techniques. Apparently,
the merchant organizations aimed to suppress conflict within their
membership and so did more to prevent disputes from developing
than to adjudicate disputes. The dispute-resolving role Shanghai
guilds and native place associations played in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and the first decades of the twentieth has only been discussed
tangentially in other works. These discussions do not address the
question of whether guilds in traditional China ever acted as impartial
tribunals more than they simply quelled disputes before they arose or
could be aired publicly. 80 It is likely, however, that traditional Chi-
nese methods for settling commercial disputes became less effective as
more commercial disputes involved transactions among strangers not
subject to guild sanctions.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ON THE MARKETPLACE
How can investment be attracted and industrial productivity sus-
tained in a chaotic environment? Contract-enforcing courts in Shang-
hai met this challenge by helping parties reduce their risk while they
maintained the openness of the city's economy. Every unsecured
177. Id., ch. IV, art. 16-22.
178. Article 36 articulated in vague terms that arbitrators were "liable" for "damage to any
party." Id., ch. V, art. 36.
179. General Chambers of Commerce arbitration figures, published in SHENBAO, 1927.
180. See the works on guilds by Susan Mann Jones, The Ningpo Pang and Financial Power
at Shanghai, in THE CHINESE CITY BETWEEN Two WORLDS (Mark Elvin & G.W. Skinner,
eds. 1974), and MORSE, supra note 36, and forthcoming work by Bryna Goodman. See also
ARNOLD, supra note 26, at 246-47.
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transaction outside a collusive structure exposed parties to some risk
of loss. This risk chilled willingness to transact where no efficient
enforcement mechanism against arbitrary takings existed. Civil
courts provided such an enforcement mechanism for any commercial
dispute between Chinese merchants in Shanghai. The courts thus
reduced the cost of raising capital and the risk of conducting business
transactions outside the protective umbrella of the guilds, and concur-
rently expanded the number and types of possible transactions.
Hence, courts were one of the forces destabilizing Shanghai's collusive
business networks. Once the courts opened the market, they continu-
ously reduced the risk to foreign merchants of participating in the
new market.
The simple presence of adversarial-style courts in Shanghai
between 1849 and 1949, along with the upsurge in civil litigation they
processed between 1927 and 1937, initiated two kinds of change in the
local economy. First, the courts enforcing foreign contracts lowered
barriers to market entry and encouraged market forces. Second, as if
to solidify and perpetuate the open market, the courts fostered a com-
petitive economic culture.
A. Opening the Local Marketplace
Civil courts opened the Shanghai marketplace in three ways.
First, they eased the transferability of land and made transferring
land a means of raising capital. Courts defined claims to land as indi-
vidual property rights, and instantly selected one of the competing
claims as the valid one. The easier it was to transfer land, the easier it
was to raise funds from the land by way of mortgages, development of
the physical infrastructure, rent collection, and land speculation. Sec-
ond, courts enforced government regulations keeping barriers to mar-
ket entry low. Third, courts protected private contracts. Lowering
the risk inherent in individual transactions opened the door to com-
petitive pricing. The new security dispensed of collusive networks as
a means to enforce credit arrangements.
1. LAND
The courts defined, individualized, and secured land ownership.
They made land rights more easily transferrable and so facilitated
raising capital. In land disputes, courts settled questions of ownership
and control. In land transactions, courts assured notice of the trans-
fer of various rights to land through public documents authorizing the
transfers.
From their inception in the 1860s, the mixed courts considered
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Chinese land-rights questions. The mixed courts employed a clever
strategy of using indigenous legal devices,III while gradually replacing
them with appropriate alien devices. This helped accomplish a
remarkably rapid and meaningful institutional involvement of the
courts in the land system. An example of a traditional Chinese insti-
tution for settling and preventing land disputes is the dibao, a local
elder with peacekeeping responsibilities within his neighborhood.
Transfers of ownership and possession of all plots required a dibao's
signature on a deed."8 2 The dibao was a witness to the transaction
and his testimony was considered valuable evidence to supplement
written agreements. Chinese parties to land disputes at the Mixed
Court commonly brought the dibao to testify at trial. He was an inte-
gral part of all Chinese transactions within the Settlement.8 3 How-
ever, courts also were fora in which the dibaos authority and possible
abuses could be challenged. 8 4 The presence of a new court system
eventually diminished the importance of the dibao. Yet, even by the
1940s, lawyers still joined dibaos as necessary witnesses to written
contracts.8 s5
Courts also contributed to a breakdown in land ownership by
family collectives. Individual family members sued each other on
charges of mismanagement of family property.8 6 Before the 1840s,
families and guilds held land in Shanghai collectively. Title to land
was not easily transferrable because there were always several claims
to the same tract of land. In Shanghai's land economy, internal Chi-
nese family mechanisms for passing land control across generations
through collective ownership broke down. Many land disputes
181. E.g., the dibao, the fangdan, the hongqi, and tax receipts; see supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
182. 3 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES, supra note 49, at 27b; interview with Zhang Quan,
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Lishisuo (July 28, 1990).
183. See, e.g., Gaowu zhandi zhi zhengzhi [dispute involving squatters], SHENBAO (China),
Dec. 3, 1914 (the case of Xu Yingshi v. Xu Mashi & Xu Yinmei); Gongxie yizhuan dibao zhi
zhouzhe [controversy regarding International Mixed Court transfer to the dibao], Apr. 19, 1914.
184. See, e.g., Daomai dichan zhi bianlun [debate over the misappropriation and sale of
land], SHENBAO (China), June 12, 1914 (reporting case of a dibao accused in the International
Mixed Court of misappropriating and selling a British land company's land).
185. One example is the contract signed July 19, 1941, part of the record of the First Special
District Court criminal case 352, file 190/4002; other examples: a marriage contract between
the Xie family and Shu family, signed Aug. 28, 1940, file 190/3999; two employment
contracts, signed Nov. 20, 1939 and Oct. 20, 1940, file 190/4011; a contract for purchase of a
factory, file 190/4012, Shanghai Municipal Archives.
186. See, e.g., Qingfeng guchenzhong jiachan [sealing of guchenzhong's family requested],
SHENBAO (China), Sept. 19-24, 1914; Zhongren nazhu difia [Chinese lowers the price of house],
id. Sept. 2, 1914 (wife accused husband of selling family land at too low a price); huotui gongsi
zhu zhi zhaiwu [ham company owners go into debt], id. Sept. 18, 1914, Oct. 8, 1914 (articles
about brothers' squabble over a mortgage on family property).
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between Chinese in Shanghai arose upon the death of a family head.
Plaintiffs were usually sons or widows who sought from the Mixed
Court a declaration of inheritance of title to the land. 8 7 People even
brought suits against their living husbands, sons, and brothers for sell-
ing or mortgaging family property to pay off personal debts without
the consent of the family. Court orders in land transactions helped
shape the local economy by providing the backbone for rapid wealth
creation in Shanghai, an important concomitant to an expanding mar-
ketplace. In order to transform city land into capital for use in the
commercial marketplace, rights to the control of land had to be pre-
cisely defined and easily and quickly transferred. Individualizing land
rights furthered this goal. Thus, courts validated a single claim to a
land tract and declared other claims void.
In Shanghai, land control became crucial for several reasons.
First, speculation in land provided lucrative incomes for enterprising
land developers and lawyers. A local plan that placed a premium on
speedy development of the city's infrastructure raised land values and
made a broad power to take designated land parcels a valuable pre-
rogative for the local government. Second, mortgages became a rich
source of commercial capital. Finally, renting multiple family dwell-
ings was a lucrative business. The mixed courts played a decisive role
in each of these types of transactions and disputes.
a. Speculation
Land was a major source of capital in Shanghai. In the 1890s, as
the value of land became the powerful engine of Shanghai's economy,
British businessmen set up "land corporations," to buy land in Shang-
hai. The land corporations instigated land speculation and, over time,
drove land prices up a thousand percent. 188 In the International Set-
tlement,8 9 land values in 1869 totalled 5,268,826 liang. By 1899 land
values amounted to 37,644,752 liang. By 1903, land values had
187. FO, supra note 50, 656/124, Sept. 8, 1908 (letter from General Wilkinson, British
Consul to A.E. Algar, Esq., regarding the widow Wang Ch'en-shih); id. 656/124, Aug. 30,
1910 (letter from Algar to British Assessor); id. 656/126, Feb. 10, 1912 (court order holding
that sons of Fang Pi Che'en are entitled to his property); id. 656/126, Jan. 26, 1912 (court
order declaring Su Chingjen, Su Chingni and Su Chinghsin, sons of deceased Su Paosen, as his
heirs); id. 656/126, Apr. 9, 1912 (court order declaring the widow Mak Tsz Tong's son the
absolute owner of lots 1786 and 1787 under Mak's deceased husband's will); id. 656/124, Aug.
6, 1910 (letter from Union Insurance Society of Canton to British Assessor regarding the land
of a deceased employee named Dong Mingje); id. 656/118, Oct. 1, 1909 (letter from Hanson,
McNeill & Jones to British Assessor regarding British Consular lot 5548).
188. 2 SHANGHAI YANJIU ZILIAO [SHANGHAI RESEARCH MATERIALS], 304-05 (Shanghai
tongshe bian, 1984).




increased to 60,423,773, and by 1930 to 597,243,161 liang. From
1904 to 1929, land prices in every district of Shanghai increased
between 10 and 29% annually. 190 Land values usually remained high
and, because speculation affected prices, volatile. Moreover, land val-
ues depended on various developments, ranging from prospective
road sites to China's political future in general.
While speculation made land more profitable, it also made land
ownership a less secure tool of control. However, courts reduced the
threat of speculators. Until a ruling by the International Mixed Court
in 1912, the Shanghai Municipal Council purchased from leaseholders
the right to take the land to build roads on it. To profit from spiraling
land values on land tracts slated for development, speculators only
needed to obtain a leasehold interest in the land, rather than purchase
the land outright. The International Mixed Court put an end to this
bizarre practice in 1912, when a tenacious Buddhist monk insisted on
challenging the practice in court. Cheng Sheng sued two speculators
for selling to the Municipal Council their leasehold rights on sections
of Buddhist temple land. The Council had condemned the land for
road building. The ruling of the International Mixed Court increased
the costs of speculating, because it forced speculators to purchase the
full bundle of ownership rights to the land, including the right to sell.
Simultaneously, the decision decreased the risk for owners who leased
their land, particularly the risk that their lessees would "steal" the
right to make infrastructural changes to the land.' 9 '
Competitive and volatile land speculation generated disagree-
ments, which the International Mixed Court could adjudicate exclu-
sively. Both foreigners and Chinese brought title suits to the Mixed
Court and litigated these suits with great energy. Foreigners were
understandably insecure about their status as land owners. Under the
terms of the extraterritorial treaties, that status was unclear. Yet,
land control was a vital part of their mission as entrepreneurs because
it created the basis of their commercial system in Shanghai. Foreign-
ers interpreted the treaties as giving foreign possession a status close
to ownership, and allowing commercial developers and the Municipal
Council's Public Works department unrestrained access to land in
order to maximize the commercial utility of the land and to make
infrastructural improvements. The treaty determined whether foreign
police had access to private dwellings and establishments to enforce
190. Lo, supra note 11, Tables 19-21, at 16.
191. FO, supra note 50, 656/131, Dec. 17, 1912 (judgment in the case of Cheng Sheng v.
Lu Chi-chang and Lu Chun-fang); N. CHINA HERALD, Dec. 21, 1912, at 845-47.
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orders from the Mixed Court and Municipal Council. It also. gave
foreigners the right to set and collect rents from Chinese tenants.
The rapidly changing use of land in Shanghai raised the value of
services that prepared land for development. Fees for removal of
gravesites were the subject of disputes within larger disagreements
over the transfer of land parcels. The mixed courts willingly enter-
tained these types of disputes and so facilitated the preparation of
land for development.' 92 Additionally, the mixed courts enforced the
hundreds of detailed regulations in the building codes of the interna-
tional settlements.
193
The International Mixed Court performed several essential func-
tions in the transfer of ownership of local land. Before parties could
transfer ownership, the Mixed Court Magistrate had to issue a formal
order to the current owners declaring a transfer of ownership. Asses-
sors channeled applications for these orders from foreign lawyers to
the Mixed Court Magistrate. The dibao then had to chop the bill of
sale and witness the transfer between buyer and seller of the
fangdan.'94 In some cases, dibao were recalcitrant and the only way
to secure their chop on bills of sale for land tracts was for Mixed
Court runners or Municipal Police officers forcibly to bring the dibao
before the Court.'95
The Mixed Court forwarded applications for foreign title deeds
to the respective consulates. This was an important function of the
court because foreign title deeds were held superior to fangdan to
prove ownership in both the consular and mixed courts, even when a
Chinese family had held the fangdan and tax receipts as supplemen-
tary proof of ownership for generations. 196 Consequently, many Chi-
nese tried to obtain foreign title deeds for their land parcels even
though they already possessed the fangdan and tax receipts. Foreign
lawyers acted as gatekeepers in the commerce of foreign title deeds.
They carried on a lucrative business taking Chinesefangdan and bills
192. E.g., Dijia yu qianfen feijun you zhaoluo [equilibrating the price of land and the cost of
removing graves has results], SHENBAO (China), Oct. 5, 1914.
193. See SHANGHAI LAND RESEARCH CENTER, SHANGHAI DICHAN DAQUAN [THE
COMPLETE SHANGHAI REAL ESTATE] (1933); Mixed Court Monthly Reports, offenses labeled
"building."
194. Tudi zhangcheng, supra note 143, at art. 6. See, e.g., Dichan jiuge zhi shengsu
[pleadings in land dispute], SHENBAO (China), Dec. 2, 1914 (referring to the case of Shen
Pingshi v. Dou Mingshan).
195. FO, supra note 50, 656/131, Dec. 30, 1913 (letter regarding acquisition of foreign title
deed for property belonging to Van Chin Sun located in the 27th bao, 9th doo); id. 656/111,
June 15, 1906.
196. Id. 656/126, Oct. 14, 1912 (memorandum on the case of Shen Shun-ch'un v. Wu A-tao
and Shen Chin-hsiang at 2).
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of sale to consulates and registering them on behalf of the Chinese
owner or channeling the applications through the appropriate Mixed
Court Assessor for more immediate attention. Not surprisingly, for-
eign lawyers were parties in many mixed court land disputes. Some
foreign lawyers took advantage of their middleman position and sued
Chinese in the Mixed Court for title to the land they had registered on
their behalf.'97 In virtually every reported land case, both parties
employed lawyers to represent them.19 8
The court reduced the risk of full-blown title disputes by trying
prophylactic suits against potential challengers to land title. Gener-
ally, if someone sought to transfer land in the settlement or land
outside but registered in a consulate, knowing of someone who might
dispute the transfer, he could sue the potential disputant before the
transfer. 99 The court also issued to parties declarations of control
over land and immunity from suit over the rights to particular land
parcels. Finally the Mixed Court notified the dibao of new mortgages
on land in their jurisdiction to reduce risk of future title disputes.
Land control was necessary for infrastructural improvements to
support the expanding population and to facilitate the commercial
need for mobility and communication. This third wealth-creating
function of land showed in the International Mixed Court suits over
the exclusivity of land control and access. Both the International and
French Mixed Courts laid the ground rules for land transactions.
These ground rules defined the scope of various property rights and
provided which rights to land were transferrable, which were inviola-
ble, and to what extent rights were compensable.
The importance of exclusive land control explains why land dis-
putes brought in the Mixed Court often alleged trespass or boundary
infringement.3° A variety of acts constituted trespass: refusing to
remove or ceasing to maintain family gravesites; 20 erection of shacks
on sites owned by others20 2 or on sites condemned by the Municipal
197. Id. 656/124, Sept. 8, 1908 (Wang Ch'en-shih v. Chou-shih and Chin Hsu-kuan); id.
656/131, Dec. 30, 1913 (Van Nieh Foong v. Van Chin Sun); id. 656/137, Mar. 24, 1915 (H.
Robertson v. Yeh Vi Sung).
198. See, e.g., Fuxun zhandi an [person who forcefully seized land is interrogated in court],
SHENBAO (China), June 21, 1914.
199. FO, supra note 50, 656/126, Sept. 21, 1912 (letter regarding lot 3825 registered in the
British Consulate).
200. The term in use at the International Mixed Court was zhantun [occupation and
annexation]. See Fuxun zhandi an [person who forcefully seized land is interrogated in court],
SHENBAO (China), June 21, 1914.
201. FO, supra note 50, 656/126, Oct. 16, 1912 (letter from British Assessor to China Land
& Finance Co.).
202. See, e.g., Gaowu zhandi zhi zhengzhi [dispute involving squatters], SHENBAO (China),
Dec. 3, 1914 (referring to the case of Xu Yingshi v. Xu Mashi & Xu Yinmei).
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Health Office;20 3 and interference with a foreign developer's removal
of the eaves of a house extending to the developer's land.2°4 In one
case, an old woman, who probably had lost title to her deceased hus-
band's land, continued to live on her homesite by selling some of the
scrap materials of her demolished house and by using the rest to piece
together a new dwelling. 2°5 The Court also granted tenant ejectment
orders when landlords wanted to make improvements or rebuild on
the land.20 6
Creating the massive infrastructure of Shanghai required giving
members of local governing bodies unrestricted access to and deci-
sion-making power over certain parcels of land. Speculators made
and lost fortunes by buying and reselling not just full title, but also
various types of rights to land in the International Settlement and
land chosen along areas outside the settlement by the Municipal
Council for development. Frequently, release of road building plans
and land condemnation schedules by the Municipal Council triggered
strings of arrangements, where the final sub-lessors negotiated with
the Municipal Council a price for their leasehold rights. The con-
tracts between parties to these transfers were based on projections of
future changes in land value. Making these projections was as risky
as gambling at the Shanghai racetrack. Insider information about
Council development plans diminished the risk, and the earlier a spec-
ulator knew of the plans, the greater advantage he enjoyed.2"7
The mixed courts tried some of the fiercest disputes over the
assumption of Municipal Council control over private land in Shang-
hai. The courts settled the disputes by giving the Council authority
over land development while providing some measure of satisfaction
to the private owners. In 1912, for example Buddhist priests won
their case against Chinese speculators, but lost their battle to block
203. FO, supra note 50, 656/133, Nov. 14 and 20, 1914 (letters of Lester, Johnson &
Morriss to British Assessor Jones); id. 656/133, Nov. 23, 1914 (letter of Platt, MacLeod &
Wilson to British Assessor regarding Woo Chow Sze).
204. Id. 656/131, Sept. 23, 1913 (letter from Davies & Brooke to British Assessor).
205. Id. 656/133, Aug. 27, 1914 (letter from Davies & Brooke to British Assessor).
206. Dichan fiuge zhi shengsu [pleadings in land dispute], SHENBAO (China), Dec. 2, 1914
(discussing the case of Shen Pingshi v. Dou Mingshan). The Municipal Police executed one
Mixed Court ejectment order on the application of a Chinese in 1915, and four in 1925.
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 38A (1915); id. at 41 (1925). These figures must be
incomplete. The files of the British Assessors contain dozens of applications every year for
ejectment orders, beginning in 1906. The Assessor granted many of them. FO, supra note 50,
656/111, Jan. 30, 1906 (China Land and Finance Co. v. Li Zung Yen, tenant of No. 775
Broadway).
207. Id. 656/131, Dec. 17, 1912 (judgment in the case of Cheng Sheng v. Lu Chi-chang
and Lu Chun-fang); N. CHINA HERALD, Dec. 21, 1912, at 845.
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construction of a road.20 8 In a 1914 decision, the French Mixed
Court held that family property could not be pledged as collateral or
used as payment in personal debt agreements. °  In another case, dis-
cussed earlier, the Buddhist priest Cheng Sheng sued two Chinese
merchants for selling their leasehold rights to the Municipal Council
so that the Council could build Bubbling Well Road, one of the major
access roads to the International Settlement through Shanghai. 210
The court declared that the Council's right to take land both inside
and outside the Settlement was not negotiable.21 1 After 1927, Chinese
judges took control of the International Mixed Court. The Municipal
Council no longer could hope for judicial articulations of its eminent
domain power, and thus began publishing dozens of regulations
detailing this power.
b. Mortgages
Because land values were high, land was good collateral for
loans. First and second mortgages on land became a common method
of raising commercial capital in Shanghai. Owners of land tracts in
the city raised cash to set up and expand commercial establishments
by mortgaging their factories, homes and vacant lots to local banks
and "land companies. ' 212 At times individuals borrowed money by
simply handing over afangdan as collateral.21 a Mortgage banks and
land companies took over the land when owners defaulted.21 4
Mortgages and trust arrangements on the land complicated ques-
tions of ownership. A variety of Mixed Court orders helped settle
these types of questions. The orders were simple dated statements
declaring that a certain person or persons was solely entitled to make
208. Id.
209. Gongchan buneng dizhai [family land cannot be used as collateral], SHENBAO (China),
Aug. 31, 1914.
210. The temple on that land is the well-known Jingansi in the northwest part of the city. 1
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES, supra note 49, at I Ia. Today, the temple is a tourist attraction on
West Nanjing Road.
211. FO, supra note 50, 656/131, Dec. 17, 1912 (judgment in the case of Cheng Sheng v.
Lu Chi-chang and Lu Chang-fang); N. CHINA HERALD, Dec. 21, 1912, at 845.
212. Land companies [dichan gongsi] also handled the construction, building management,
design, buying and selling of real property. SHANGHAISHI GONGSHANGYE JILAN [OUTLINE OF
SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE] (Gongshang chubanshe [Industrial and
Commercial Press], 1948), at 274-75.
213. See Shike fen nian bahuan [party ordered to return a portion of annual profit],
SHENBAO (China), Oct. 8, 1914 (party borrowed money using fangdan as collateral).
214. FO, supra note 50, 656/118, Mar. 20, 1909 (letter regarding Ching Siang Chao's
defaulted mortgage to the Eastern Trading Co. and Brunner, Mond & Co. Alkali
Manufacturers); id. 656/118, Dec. 12, 1908 (letter from one Brunner to Pelham Warren
regarding land in the Yangtzepoo district of Shanghai); Tudi zhangcheng, supra note 143, at
article 8.
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decisions concerning the property. If a bank had a mortgage on the
property when the owner died, and a lawyer held the land in trust for
the deceased, the lawyer could apply for a Mixed Court order author-
izing him to ignore the deceased's family and transfer the land to
whomever the bank wished. Such orders also protected the lawyer
from future claims by the family.215
Bankruptcy and foreclosure were common in the volatile econ-
omy of republican-era Shanghai. Liquidations created so much legal
business that lawyers used their own boilerplate forms to process
them. Land companies with defaulting mortgagors or tenants
retained lawyers solely for this purpose.216 By deciding how to parcel
the assets of defaulted mortgagors to creditors, the Mixed Court
helped redistribute great amounts of wealth in China's financial capi-
tal.2"7 In the chaotic economy, without an arbiter to enforce the
apportionment of mortgaged property upon foreclosure, banks would
probably not have agreed to advance the cash for business ventures.
Given the important capital-raising function of mortgages, therefore,
the International Mixed Court's enforcement of such mortgages pro-
vided an essential component to commercial and financial growth in
Shanghai.
Two aspects of the mixed courts' role in property transactions
involving mortgages compromised any stabilizing effect of the courts
on the real estate market, however. First, the mixed courts refused to
regulate land transactions except on a case-by-case basis. They devel-
oped no clear rules for prioritizing the claims of competing mortga-
gees. Second, by making risky mortgages possible, the courts
encouraged speculative transactions. The courts could have tried to
change the propensity of Shanghai merchants to engage in risky ven-
tures. Instead, the courts chose to be enforcers of private arrange-
ments, only occasionally formulating rules on how merchants,
landowners, and real estate developers were to conduct their transac-
tions. Without court-enforced sanctions against entering into risky
transactions, the only penalty for entering a risky transaction was los-
ing the bargain - not a deterrent to those not deterred by high risk
alone. In fact, the International and French Mixed Courts went to
215. FO, supra note 50, 656/124, Aug. 23, 1910 (letter from Hanson, McNeil & Jones to
British judge); id. 656/126, Feb. 10, 1912 (court order); Court order regarding lot 2457,
registered in the British Consulate, Jan. 26, 1912.
216. The Cathay Land Co. hired attorney Jiang Bingfan to handle a liquidation. File 190/
4007, Shanghai Municipal Archives.
217. Disputes over mortgaged land were common enough to appear almost daily in
newspaper reports. See, e.g., Tianchan dichang qiankuan [field of land compensates for money
owed], SHENBAO (China), Sept. 18-24, 1914.
1384
COURTS OF SHANGHAI
great lengths to enforce the bargains originally struck by merchants.
The courts imprisoned even penniless defendants until they used their
social contacts to amass the judgment award. The courts also
obtained personal guarantors for defendants and imprisoned the guar-
antors until they satisfied the judgment.? 8
c. Rents
A third source of capital from land was the rental income the
land produced. The International Mixed Court and its successors had
exclusive jurisdiction over landlord-tenant disputes arising on prop-
erty in the International Settlement. Economic and political volatility
constantly spawned disputes over leaseholds. Merchants usually
rented their factories, warehouses, and shops, and so forced their
landlords to come to court as creditors in the event of bankruptcy.
2 9
Landlords were not the only parties interested in settling lease-
hold disputes quickly. The status of leasehold arrangements was
financially significant also for the Municipal Council. After all, rent-
ers formed its tax base.220 Hundreds of thousands of Chinese lived in
the International Settlement, most of them renting their homes.
Those able to amass enough capital to purchase or construct multiple-
dwelling buildings reaped substantial financial rewards from renting
rooms and apartments. Shanghai grew in a climate of political vola-
tility. The precarious political climate, combined with Shanghai's
state-of-the-art infrastructure, made the heavily policed International
Settlement the most desirable place to live in the East China region.
Elites, as well as destitute refugees, flocked to the city and inflated the
demand for rental units. Landlords raised rents at will and drove the
market with continual rent hikes.22' The turnover rate of rental resi-
218. See, e.g., Dengbao shengming zhi xiaoli [the effect of newspaper announcement],
SHENBAO (China), Aug. 8, 1914 (describing borrower's reliance on a family member to
guarantee payment of the court judgment at the French Mixed Court).
219. Hyperinflation forced landlord G.E. Marden & Co. to raise the rent of warehouses by
40% within a short time. When one tenant, the Diamond Steel Furniture Co., refused to pay
the increases, Marden hired attorney Jiang Bingfan to bring a suit of "vacant possession"
against the tenant in the First Special District Court. Judgment July 14, 1941, file 190/3998,
Shanghai Municipal Archives. Another example is a suit on a written lease between Zhongguo
yang paper factory and E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. The lease was signed Dec. 22, 1941, and the
suit filed on Oct.7, 1942. File 190/4006, Shanghai Municipal Archives.
220. The landlords paid to the Shanghai Municipal Council a tax that was added to the
amount of the tenants' rent. Files 190/4181 and 190/3998, Shanghai Municipal Archives.
221. Rapid rises in rents in 1921 and 1922 in Shanghai created a desperate situation for
tenants. The International Mixed Court suspended the building licenses of landlords who
persisted in charging exorbitant rents. The measure helped save the city from economic
disaster. FO, supra note 50, 656/164, Nov. 24, 1921 (letter from Platt, MacLeod, Gregson &
Ward to British Judge Blackburn); id. 656/164, Dec. 6, 1921 (letter and attached accounting
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dences was high.222 A sublet market flourished, buoyed by the unsa-
tiated need for housing. Subletting provided some downward
pressure on turnover rates.
The multiple layering of leasehold arrangements was a fertile
ground for landlord-tenant disputes. The International Mixed Court
was willing to try disputes over all kinds of leasehold arrangements,
and so reduced the risk of leasing property in Shanghai. Lawyers for
some of Shanghai's wealthiest citizens, such as the Sassoon family and
Edward Ezra, regularly brought rent disputes against tenants before
the Mixed Court. Suits for unpaid rent constituted another large por-
tion of land disputes. 223 In some cases, the tenants withheld payment
from a new owner of the land they leased. The new owner had two
possible remedies; either petition the Mixed Court to order the old
owner to hand over the rent pass book necessary for collecting rent,224
or have the Mixed Court send a runner to accompany the district's
dibao to notify the tenants of the change in ownership.225  Landlords'
lawyers also asked for harsh monetary penalties if tenants ignored
judgments and refused to vacate.226
Intermediaries became significant players in the lucrative rental
market. In one of their many capacities, lawyers and land companies
acted as agents or managers for landlords in tenant matters. Land
companies and lawyers managed rental properties by collecting rents
for landlords, paying utility bills and fielding tenant complaints. The
proliferation of intermediaries complicated land control rights by con-
tractualizing every level of the leasehold arrangement, thus multiply-
ing the potential for contract disputes.227
reports from British Judge to Platt & Co.); id. 656/164, Dec. 9, 1921 (letter from British Judge
to Edward Ezra); id. 656/164, Dec. 10, 1921 (letter and attached accounting reports from
British judge to Mixed Court Chinese judge Kuan); MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, Dec. 15, 1921, at
412; Apr. 20, 1922, at 141.
222. 1 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES, supra note 49, at 23b-24a.
223. See, e.g., FO, supra note 50, 656/131, May 27, 1913 (letter from Platt, MacLeod &
Wilson to British Assessor Garstin); id. 656/124, Dec. 19, 1910 (letter from J.E. Salmon to
British Assessor Garstin regarding David Sassoon & Co. v. Zung Ling Kuen). Foreigners also
sued unrepresented foreigners for unpaid rent. E.g., id. 656/164, Nov. 21, 1921 (letter from
Platt, MacLeod, Gregson & Ward to British Assessor Blackburn regarding Edward Ezra &
Co. v. The Russian Assembly).
224. Id. 656/118, Sept. 10, 1909 (letter from the Kiangsu Land & Construction Co to
British Assessor regarding lot 5877 in Putong, registered in the British Consulate).
225. Id. 656/118, June 30, 1909 (letter from Noel, Murray & Co. to Senior Mixed Court
Magistrate regarding Jan Yik v. Chao Ming Char).
226. Dichan jiuge zhi shengsu [pleadings in land dispute], SHENBAO (China), Dec. 2, 1914
(Shen Pingshi v. Dou Mingshan); FO, supra note 50, 656/111, Jan. 30, 1906 (discussing China
Land and Finance Co. v. Li Zung Yen, tenant of No. 775 Broadway).
227. For example, the China Realty Company, acting as agent for a set of apartment
buildings, hired a prominent Chinese attorney to represent it in a series of lawsuits against
1386
COURTS OF SHANGHAI
The proliferation of intermediaries increased confusion over legal
rights and duties. The confusion spawned disputes, and courts served
as leverage when landlords wished to enforce the terms of their
leases.2 28 Courts were less available to tenants to enforce promises
made to them by their landlords, however. In Shanghai, tenants had
virtually no legal rights against managers; tenants could not sue man-
agers unless tenants had reserved such a right in a separate contract
with the manager. Chinese tenants tended not to enter such con-
tracts, and instead preferred flexible tenancy arrangements free of
written contracts or specified termination dates.229
Chinese tenants sublet to other Chinese, thus complicating both
the collection of rent for the landlord and the carrying out of eject-
ment orders by the court. 230 The practice of subleasing in the Settle-
ment created an entire class of second-tier landlords who made a
profit charging rents to their subtenants. Naturally, the tenants who
sublet cared about preserving their claims to their leases as zealously
as if they held ownership titles. They brought suits in the Mixed
Court to certify the transfer of leases23' and to recertify leaseholds
when lease deeds were lost or stolen.232
Courts secured the right of land ownership, and thereby
strengthened its connection to capital raising, by adopting a pro-land-
lord bias in their decisions and orders. The pro-landlord pattern
shifted the cost of lease transactions to tenants and reduced the risk of
loss in lease ventures for landlords. Mixed Court decisions in rent
disputes between landlords and tenants usually favored landlords, and
those between tenants and subtenants usually favored the lessee col-
lecting rent from his sub-tenant. In disputes over unpaid rent the
Mixed Court also issued eviction and sealing orders so that new ten-
ants could immediately move in and begin paying rent. The old ten-
ants' possessions were auctioned and the proceeds used to compensate
the landlord. These orders cost foreign landlords nothing and Chi-
tenants who refused to pay mounting rents during a period of hyperinflation. File 190.4181,
Shanghai Municipal Archives.
228. E.g., the case of China Realty Co. v. Shanghai Water Works Co., First Special District
Court, civil case no. 31 (involving nonpayment of water bills by owners of 65 houses managed
by China Realty Co.). File 190/4181, Shanghai Municipal Archives.
229. Qian, supra note 29, at 8, 10.
230. FO, supra note 50, 656/131, Nov. 1913 (letter from Davies & Brooks to British
Assessor).
231. Id. 656/118, 24th day, 10th moon, 1909 (letter from the Mixed Court Magistrate
regarding the application for an order to transfer the lease of property from Ho Chin Fong to
Ho Yuen Tsing).
232. Id. 656/124, Oct. 19, 1910 (letter from Hanson, McNeill & Jones to British Assessor).
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nese landlords only a nominal fee.2 33 The public knowledge that these
orders were always executed at the mere request of landlords reduced
the cost of lease transactions for landlords and increased the cost of
leasing for tenants. Simply stated, sealing orders shifted the risk of
nonpayment of rent to tenants. The court left landlords with almost
complete discretion to take action against tenants through application
for court orders. Landlords could obtain sealing orders with minimal
evidence of wrongdoing. Sealing orders unmistakably directed ten-
ants quickly to settle the outstanding amounts with their landlords or
else risk ejection and loss of all personal property. Tenants had about
an hour or two to appease the landlord between the time the court
issued the sealing order and the moment the police arrived at the
leased premises with boards, hammer, nails, and an official sign
declaring the premises sealed and not to be reopened under pain of
criminal sanction. Once the police sealed the premises, a tenant could
still negotiate with the landlord to recover his possessions, but the
tenant was in a less advantageous bargaining position. These orders
had considerable power to "induce" settlement.
Even after they became Chinese courts, the mixed courts contin-
ued issuing sealing orders, and the Chinese District Court willingly
adopted the sealing order. However, the three District Courts
assigned some of the cost of the order to the landlord by imposing on
the petitioner the costs of sealing the defendant's premises and auc-
tioning the defendant's possessions. The Chinese District Court also
was more reluctant than the other two District Courts to grant sealing
orders, though the court still required only minimal evidence of the
landlord's need to recover personal property or unpaid rent, or to
rebuild.234
2. LOCAL REGULATION OF THE MARKET: THE CRIMINAL FACE
OF THE COURTS
Local government regulation of Shanghai's economy grew
between 1900 and 1927. Criminal cases enforced local regulation.
Licensing requirements, for example, lowered barriers of entry to the
marketplace. Engaging in entrepreneurial activities such as operating
shops and vehicles and renting lodging required that residents
purchase licenses. Because licensing was relatively cheap and open to
233. Mixed Court Rules of Procedure, rules 19-25, Civil proceedings, at 9.
234. Qian, supra note 29, "Zhulun" [articles] section, at 9. E.g., Judgment of Jan. 24, 1928
(granting petition of Tu Meichun), JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 301; Judgment of Jan. 26, 1929
(granting petition of Zhang Wenqing), id. at 295; Judgment of Mar. 25, 1929 (sealing order
denied while contract dispute was pending on grounds that defendant, who paid rent for his
shop, would have no way to pay damages if he lost the contract suit), id. at 303.
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anyone, it gave official permission to conduct commerce without guild
blessing. 235 Entering the retail market was less expensive under the
licensing regime than under the guild regime.
The criminal branch of the courts enforced this municipal patrol-
ling of the marketplace. Seeking fines for violators, the Municipal
Police prosecuted violations of the licensing regulations at the Inter-
national Mixed Court. License cases comprised over half of the
court's docket, and they accounted for the largest share of any type of
case, criminal or civil. Local government concerns about the econ-
omy affected the prosecution of criminal offenses. The Municipal
Police enthusiastically used its plentiful weaponry to establish a
monopoly on official use of force within the International Settlement.
They exercised exclusive discretion over whether to prosecute crimi-
nal cases at the International Mixed Court. In doing so, the Munici-
pal Police controlled the size and range of the Mixed Court's criminal
caseload. Although the level of violence in republican-era Shanghai
was notoriously high due to political violence such as assassinations
and kidnappings, licensing prosecutions made up the bulk of the
International Mixed Court's criminal docket.2 36  Licensing was so
successful a strategy for raising revenue that the Chinese municipal
government copied it and sold licenses to Chinese enterprises within
its jurisdiction.
2 37
235. The Municipal Council created the license regulations and collected the revenues from
licenses even though the founding charter for the International Settlement gave the power to
sell licenses exclusively to the consuls. See Tudi zhangcheng, supra note 143, art. 7, at 200-13.
236. See Table I, supra text accompanying notes 64-67. For example, from 1918 through
1925, the Police every month arrested thousands on charges of "begging," "hawking,"
"ragpicking," "nuisance," "vehicles," and "traffic." The Police dropped most charges against
the defendants, many of whom were Chinese and therefore were brought before the Mixed
Court for sentencing. The number of defendants charged for those petty offenses fluctuated
monthly between roughly 1000 and 5000. See Return of Foreigners coming Under Notice of
Police for Criminal and Other Offenses: Not Charged, in Monthly Police Reports, MUNICIPAL
GAZETTE, 1918-1925; Return of Foreigners and Chinese Summoned or Apprehended and
Charged, and Return of Foreigners and Chinese Apprehended and Not Charged, id. The
Municipal Council's annual report for 1922 noted that "the greater attention given by the
Police to traffic offenses is indicated by the increase in ricksha cases." ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 64, at 69A (1922). The report for 1925 states: "At the Special Traffic Sessions at
the Mixed Court, prosecutions show a slight decrease to 2,821 compared with 3,091 for the
previous year. This is entirely due to the fact that men ordinarily employed on traffic duty
were otherwise employed in connection with, and during, the 'Strike' period." Id. at 33
(1925). The decrease in the Court's total caseload from 1922 to 1923 (see Table III) was not
due to a dip in the Court's popularity. The decrease stemmed from a cut-back in the number
of petty traffic cases prosecuted by the Municipal Police as a result of the strain on the Court
caused by the institution of a Traffic Court. In 1922, an over-zealous police force prosecuted
about 3,003 cases, resulting in a 150% increase over 1921. Id. at 69A (1922).
237. For the number of hotels operating under Chinese municipal government license, see
SHANGHAI MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF STATISTICS, SHANGHAI TEBIE SHI
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TABLE IV - TOTAL CRIMINAL CASES AND NUMBER OF LICENSE






















The licensing regulations were yet another market stimulant
administered by the courts. The mixed courts and the second wave of
Chinese courts prosecuted people for various acts that raised risk and
transaction costs in the Shanghai marketplace. These acts were
labelled the fraudulent breach of promise, breach of fiduciary duty,2 °
deceit, misrepresentation, misappropriation,241 copyright infringe-
ments, trademark disputes,242 illegal fabrication of negotiable instru-
ments, intimidation,243  burglary of warehouses and ships,
SHIZHENG TONGJI JIYAO (IMPORTANT STATISTICS OF THE SHANGHAI SPECIAL
MUNICIPALITY GOVERNMENT] 126-30 (1927).
238. Numbers from ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64 (numerous records between 1912 and
1926); see specifically id. at 70A-71A (1919); id. at 35-36 (1941); id. at 44-45 (1942). Figures
for 1940-42 include single appeals cases.
239. Figure is my own estimate, based on monthly figures available for six months in 1912.
240. Judgment of June 13, 1931 (Chairman of the Board Zeng Xianzhi v. Board of
Directors of Zhoulu Corp.), Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal Case No. 22, JIANGSU,
supra note 45, at 159-61.
241. See, e.g., Judgment of June 9, 1931 (Merchants Meng Handu, Li Shengji, and Meng
Shanyang v. Merchant Shen Shixing), Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal Case No.
574, id. at 209-11; Judgment of June 13, 1931 (Zhu Renquan v. Yang Shansong), Shanghai
Special District Court, Criminal Case No. 488, id. at 229; Judgment of Mar. 30, 1931
(Merchant Cheng Gongyuan v. Cheng Xiuming), Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal
Case No. 174, id. at 193.
242. See, e.g., Judgment of Apr. 29, 1931 (Shanghai Mun. Couns. v. Merchant Le Genbao),
Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal Case No. 193, id. at 197.
243. See, e.g., Judgment of July 30, 1931 (Shanghai Mun. Couns. v. Chauffeur Qi
Gongsheng), Special District Court Criminal Case No. 292, id. at 53; Case against
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counterfeiting paper currency,244 coins, printed documents (such as
contracts and banknotes), and securities, falsifying weights and meas-
ures, and "doing harm to agriculture, industry, and commerce.
245
The criminal charge "doing harm to agriculture, industry, and com-
merce" usually triggered a corresponding civil action for trademark
infringement.2 4 6
Some types of prosecutions reduced the risk and cost of doing
business for industry and banks. Criminal cases that involved factory
strikers247 and trademarks248 reduced the risk and cost of transactions
for factory owners. The Municipal Police successfully prosecuted fac-
tory strikers who disrupted production in the Settlement,249 reducing
for factory owners the risk of breaching supply contracts. The fact
that manufacturers could win in trademark cases against other manu-
facturers reduced the risk of losing market share to competitors.
Shanghai's financial sector relied on the courts to preserve the
integrity of the several monetary systems in use. The International
Mixed Court tried Chinese for forgery and counterfeit of coin and
paper money. 250 Forgery cases usually involved commercial paper.
Chinese banks issued their own notes, which functioned as cur-
rency, 251 to depositors as ten-day extensions of credit.
coppersmith Gu Jingui (arising from a threatening letter Gu sent to his neighbor, whose family
he knew to be rich, demanding 50,000 yuan), Special District Court, Criminal case no. 2499,
decided Feb. 13, 1931.
244. See, e.g., Judgment of May 25, 1931 (Shanghai Mun. Couns. v. Shen Yuankang),
Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal Case No. 213, id. at 151.
245. See, e.g., Judgment of May 4, 1931, Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal Case
No. 196, id. at 121. The number of prosecutions in Shanghai's three largest courts are listed in
the ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section, at 44-45, 79, 109, 111,
113.
246. See, e.g., Judgment of May 4, 1931 (Bank Manager Lin Dao'e v. Merchants Chen
Zhengcai, Song Huangsheng, and Zheng Wenkai), Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal
Case No. 196, JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 121; Judgment of May 11, 1931 (Corporation Board
of Director Qiao Ya and Corporation Chairman-Secretary Bai Anshi v. Wu Lusheng, Yang
Linzhi, Zheng Yanlin, and Shi Renfang), Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal Case No.
184, id. at 127; Judgment of Apr. 8, 1931 (Cotton Cloth Factory Manager Jiang Jiezhen v.
Cotton Cloth Factory Managers Zheng Zhonghe), Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal
Case No. 12, id. at 187.
247. See Huang Wensi, Lun woguo pochanfa diaoxie shikeji chexiao zhi xiaoli [essay on the
effects on our country of the approval and abolition of mediation in the strike law], DISHIWUJIE
BIYE JINIANKAN (Yearbook of the 15th graduating class), "Zhulun" [articles] section, at 43-50
(Shanghai fazheng xueyuan [Shanghai College of Law and Politics], 1939).
248. FO, supra note 50, 656/118, Mar. 29, 1909 (letter from British Consul General in
Tianjin to British American Tobacco Co.).
249. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 77A (1922); id. at 49 (1923).
250. E.g., MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, Nov. 20, 1920, at 274.
251. 4 MISCELLANEOUS NOTES, supra note 49, at 47 (listing 109 qianzhuang that provided
checking accounts to members whose checks were not redeemable for 10 days after signing);
Qian, supra note 29, at 12-13.
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The courts, however, did not make industrial and financial trans-
actions cheaper or more secure for all participants. The courts did
not allow reorganization of firms once banks foreclosed on their
assets, thereby making credit generally cheaper, but setting up busi-
nesses riskier than if courts allowed reorganization. Nor did the
courts when they parcelled out assets of firms in foreclosure try to
prevent a race of creditors to the courthouse. Thus, while foreclosure
lawsuits may have reduced the risk for plaintiff banks of losing loans,
it did not decrease the risk of forfeiting wealth in credit transactions
for those who happened to arrive late at the courthouse. The courts
did not follow any rule when banks sued each other for foreclosed
assets.252
TABLE V - SOME TYPES OF IMC CRIMINAL CASES: 1906-1926

















1922 55 42 71254
1923 64 18 12255
1924 80 28 117256
1925 117 26 408257
1926 121 26 142
The International Mixed Court enforced another type of govern-
ment regulation that eroded the guilds' prerogatives, further reducing
252. See, e.g., FO, supra note 50, 656/118, June 11, 1909 (letter from Gardner to Hanson,
McNeill & Jones regarding Shanghai Paper Mill in default of mortgage to Ningbo Commercial
Bank).
253. Counterfeiting cases include prosecutions for forgery of both coin and paper money.
254. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 77A (1922).
255. The Report of the Municipal Police Commissioner K.J. McEuen states that the police
prosecuted "more than a dozen" strikers at the Mixed Court. Id. at 49 (1923).
256. Id. at 57 (1924).
257. Id. at 52 (1925).
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the guilds' grip on the marketplace by trying Chinese residents of the
International Settlement for failure to pay taxes to the Municipal
Council.25 Enforcement of tax obligations encroached on one of the
guilds' traditional spheres of authority. Chairmen of guild commit-
tees in the late nineteenth century had struck agreements with local
government officials who gave the guilds kickbacks in exchange for
collecting local taxes and delivering them into official hands.259
In yet another sense, much of the criminal work of the Mixed
Court fostered commerce. The Court enforced municipal regulations
that promoted sanitation, traffic safety, and public order.26 Promot-
ing public health, safety, and order helped make the city attractive to
capital investment. The Court also enforced municipal taxes,26 '
fines,262 and license fees,263 which boosted government revenues,
which the government funneled back into the locality. These reve-
nues funded a world-class physical infrastructure, including state-of-
the-art roads, parks, electrification, telephone system, and sanitation
system. Along with the revenues, court enforcement of zoning regula-
tions and takings under the Municipal Council's eminent domain
power facilitated the Council's economic growth plans.
3. CREDIT
The contract-enforcing services offered by the courts undermined
258. Owners paid a dwellings tax of 8 yuan per 100 yuan of the assessed value of the
building. The physical character of the neighborhood influenced the assessments. 1
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES, supra note 49, at 32b.
259. JERNIGAN, supra note 34, at 219.
260. Traffic regulations were introduced fairly swiftly in the 1920s, after a decade of
reluctance by local courts to charge car drivers with murder when deaths resulted from auto
accidents. Upon the introduction of automobiles in the 1910s, the streets of Shanghai became
extremely hazardous. Cases of fatal automobile accidents tried at the International and
French Mixed Courts made frequent headlines in the largest circulating newspaper in
Shanghai. However, these trials may not have gone far toward inducing drivers to adopt more
cautious driving habits. Convictions were rare. Even the driver of a car who ran over a five-
year old boy was acquitted. See Qiche zhuangbi xiaohai zhi jieju [outcome of child's fatal car
accident], SHENBAO (China), July 1, 1914; Fuxun qiche zhuangbi xiaohai an [update on case of
child killed when hit by car], SHENBAO (China), Sept. 1, 1914.
261. The original agreement between the Shanghai Daotai and the British Consul in 1845
created a Committee of Roads and Jetties, whose function was to receive and maintain land
surrendered for public use. Tudi zhangcheng, supra note 143, art. 5. The Municipal Council
evolved out of this body. The only taxation permitted by the agreement was a tax on
foreigners who owned land and had consular representation. The tax went to an elected group
who spent the funds on behalf of the Committee of Roads and Jetties. Id., art. 10.
262. William C. Johnstone, Jr., The Administration of the International Settlement at
Shanghai, China 44-45 (1931) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University).
263. From 1916 to 1925, license fees generated seven and a half million teals, roughly
thirteen percent of the Council's income for those ten years. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64,
at 434 (1925).
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traditional Chinese merchant collusion by lowering the barrier to
market entry created by the transaction cost of entering into agree-
ments without the means to make them binding. The threat of civil
litigation helped to enforce any kind of business transaction and low-
ered the risk of entering into individual transactions without collusive
backing. The civil courts enforced credit agreements for anyone who
had contact with a Chinese resident or business in the International
Settlement of Shanghai. The courts also lowered the cost of enforcing
credit arrangements. In contrast to the self-help mechanisms and the
sheer effort required to maintain and repair a business relationship
outside the purview of the guilds, courts enforced debt contracts
quickly and definitely.
Guilds for centuries had had a self-perpetuating hold on the mar-
ket: their leverage was the ability to threaten withdrawal of a crucial
good or service-a prerogative made possible by their exclusive con-
trol over the good or service. As long as a guild maintained a monop-
oly, the only way non-guild members could fill their needs was to
enter an agreement with the guild on the guild's terms.
Guilds enforced retail credit arrangements in the same manner.
Long-term personal relationships formed the basis for such agree-
ments, resulting in a liberal and widespread availability of credit.
Accounts were customarily settled once a year at the New Year. Col-
lusive arrangements among retailers provided leverage over customers
when personal relationships weakened or broke down.2"
Until civil courts appeared in Shanghai, guilds guaranteed
enforcement of agreements between guild members by threatening or
executing expulsion. Guilds guaranteed enforcement of agreements
between guild members and non-guild members by threatening with-
drawal of the guilds' goods or services from the non-guild member.
High transaction costs plagued business deals made outside the
guilds' purview because parties had no low-cost alternative to make
agreements binding.
Leverage was particularly essential to the profitability of business
deals in Shanghai because exchange rates fluctuated wildly-bargains
struck at a set price could easily ruin one of the parties by the delivery
date. Chinese middlemen sometimes waited to accept delivery until
the exchange rate turned in their favor. In order to keep a Chinese
264. For example, assume Shanghai had only two rice shops, Rice Shop A, which sells on
credit to a retail customer, and Rice Shop B. The customer does not settle his account at the
appropriate time, and instead goes to buy rice on credit at Rice Shop B. If Rice Shop B has an
alliance with Rice Shop A, the customer will not succeed in obtaining the rice he needs, and
must either make good his account at Rice Shop A or starve.
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middleman financially afloat while he waited for a favorable exchange
rate, both foreign dealers and native banks gave the middleman liberal
advances, using the cargo as collateral. If patience and loans were not
enough to save him, the Chinese middleman often repudiated the con-
tract. Merchants developed a variety of self-help mechanisms to cope
with the uncertainty of enforcement, but the success of all of the
mechanisms ultimately depended on the strength of the business rela-
tionship involved.265
The courts provided leverage or bargaining power to merchants
outside the guild structure to engage in transactions with guild mem-
bers or people independent of the guilds. But even guild members
could go to court if they thought they would lose in a guild arbitra-
tion. Monopoly power also provided leverage in credit arrangements
in wholesale commerce. The availability of a credit-enforcement
mechanism outside the guild network removed the source of the
guilds' leverage. The courts lowered transaction costs for independ-
ent merchants by providing an enforcement mechanism outside net-
work alliances.
Of course, had substantive law influenced civil court judgments
as heavily as did evidence of the terms of the individual parties' agree-
ments, then the courts of Shanghai might not have provided an alter-
native to guild leverage. Preliminary evidence suggests, however, that
the civil courts tended to enforce the bargains struck by the parties
rather than the commercial statutes.
266
Persistent court enforcement of contracts created a new freedom
for merchants. In most of the reported civil suits before the courts,
merchants did not invoke guild status even when they were engaged
in trades in which guilds existed.2 67 In such cases, it is plausible to
265. Under a common form of import transaction, called the "forward indent," a Chinese
middleman bore all the risks of nondelivery, including insurance, interest, storage, import
taxes and Chinese commissions, in exchange for a commission (usually from 1.5 percent to 2.5
percent of the value of the goods). A foreign dealer based in Shanghai, a "hong," would obtain
an offer from a Chinese middleman on price and delivery terms. Such terms were difficult to
predict even for the middlemen because delivery time ranged from two months to two years for
any given shipment. After the hong's client, a foreign manufacturer based abroad, accepted
the offer, the hong would draw up a written contract containing terms of quantity, price,
shipment, and goods specifications. Upon shipment, an international bank would transfer
funds from the hong's account to the bank's local branch in Shanghai, with a maturity date
around the time of delivery. If the Chinese middleman did not pay the hong after a
predetermined delivery date, the hong frequently negotiated an extension from the local bank
branch and absorbed the cost of the additional interest. AINSCOUGH, supra note 33, at 24-25.
266. According to my preliminary research, only in the 1930s and 1940s did the District
Courts of Shanghai become constricted by national statutes.
267. See, e.g., Fagongtang xiao'an [cases at the French Mixed Court], and Gonggong
gongtang xiao'an [cases at the International Mixed Court], SHENBAO (China), June 19, 1914
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assume that the parties were either not guild members or were pursu-
ing dispute settlement in a transaction outside the sanction of the
guild. Guild affiliation did not improve chances of success in court.
Instead, the significant role accorded to lawyers gave individual Chi-
nese the chance to secure powerful court judgments regardless of their
personal connections to Shanghai's commercial organizations.
The types of actions prevalent in the courts demonstrate the liti-
gants' independence from guild control and the willingness of the
courts to grant specific performance. The most common type of civil
case was the debt dispute. The typical dispute concerned cash loans
between individuals, frequently where at least one party was from out
of town. 268  Other cases arose from disintegrated profit-sharing
arrangements 269 or unpaid retail credit. 270 The court also accepted
petitions to enforce contracts for the delivery of goods when a sudden
price change made delivery unprofitable for one of the parties and
created a windfall for the other.27'
Industrialization gave rise to new forms of ownership, products,
and marketing opportunities. The traditional expertise of the dibao
and the functions of local land offices were irrelevant to determining
the ownership status of corporate securities. Without a ready-made
hold on manufactured goods, guilds were not positioned to compete
with courts for disputes arising from the buying and selling of such
goods.272
The courts posed a threat to the guilds by trying liquidations of
(reporting on dispute involving rice shop owners); Suojia bei'ou [person who demanded a price
assaulted], SHENBAO (China), Nov. 2, 1914 (describing events where a rice shop claimed a
portion of retail customer's assets when customer went bankrupt before paying for rice bought
on credit); Judgment of Dec. 18, 1928 (Gong Chengxu v. Huang Eda (merchant)), Shanghai
Special District Court Civil Case No. 1879 (Gong was owner of a hemp sack store; no mention
of guild affiliation despite presence in Shanghai of a hemp guild), JIANGSU, supra note 45, at
269.
268. See, e.g,, Zhaiwu ren xianqi dao'an [case of debtor whose time is up], SHENBAO (China),
Aug. 4, 1914 (describing contract drawn up in the nearby city of Suzhou).
269. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1929 (Zhu Jiafan v. Chen Yisheng), District Court Civil Case
No, 1903, JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 279 (involving defendant who managed a profit-making
company for the plaintiff and kept the profits); Judgment of Jan. 18, 1929 (Fan Bingyu v. Jin
Hanchen), District Court Civil Case No. 1967, id. at 271 (describing dispute between joint
owners of company).
270. E.g., Judgment of Jan. 18, 1929 (Pan Chinheng v. Jin Hanchen), District Court Civil
Case No. 1967, id. at 271; Judgment of Jan. 12, 1929 (Zhu Jiafan v. Chen Yisheng) District
Court Civil Case No. 1903, id. at 279.
271. File 190/4013, Shanghai Municipal Archives.
272. E.g., Judgment of Dec. 18, 1928 (Da Kangyang Co. v. Wu Yanwei), Special District
Court, Civil Case No. 1891, JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 265 (involving situation where buyer of
processed silk sued employee of silk thread factory for nondelivery of goods).
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Chinese banks.273 Chinese banks formed the most powerful elements
of the guild world in Shanghai, and it was the freedom of the Chinese
banks to grant liberal extensions of credit and operate at low capitali-
zation that gave the guilds discretion over the financial aspects of
their business transactions.274 Courts supervised the liquidation of
financial institutions and so withheld discretion over the granting of
credit from the families who dominated Shanghai's financial world.
Though the major legal innovations occurred in the civil courts,
the criminal courts accommodated the merchants' desire to punish
business associates for reneging on promises or duties. Some criminal
cases arose from simple business relationships gone awry. The courts
allowed private complainants to bring criminal charges against any-
one.275 This way, an individual could bring a private foe, such as a
business competitor, into court, using a court prosecutor to represent
his case.2 76 And they did. Merchants initiated prosecutions against
those who "cheated them out of money. ' 277 Criminal actions alleging
cheating routinely carried pendant civil actions that sought monetary
compensation for unpaid debt.2 78 From 1927 to 1948, the three larg-
est courts in Shanghai allowed complainants to sue criminal defend-
ants in three types of supplementary civil actions: misappropriation
of goods, damage from nonpayment of debt, and defamation.
2 79
Merchants used libel suits as a way to expand the scope of their dam-
ages, claiming defamation of their business reputation.28 °
273. See FO, supra note 50, 656/116, Nov. 30, 1908 (draft letter from Sir Pelham Warren to
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank).
274. Sanford, supra note 28, at 104, 106, 148-55.
275. Interview with Jiang Bingfan, practicing attorney in Shanghai from 1933 to 1949 (May
1991).
276. One of the wealthiest foreigners in Shanghai, British citizen Edward Ezra, sued a
business associate for embezzling funds from the sale of Ezra's opium stashes. The case drew
considerable public attention. See The Great Canton Road Opium Case, N. CHINA HERALD,
Aug. 22, 1925, at 220-21; id., Aug. 29, 1925, at 267; id., Sept. 19, 1925, at 398-99; id., Sept. 26,
1925, at 444.
277. See Judgment of July 4, 1931 (Ceng Shaohuai v. Deng Yi), Shanghai District Court,
JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 29; Judgment of July 11, 1931 (Guo Zhuqiao, Manager of the
China Commercial Savings Bank v. Jiang Junsun), Shanghai District Court, id. at 17;
Judgment of Nov. 30, 1930 (Wu Xibai v. Li Jingyuan), Shanghai Special District Court,
Criminal Case No. 79, id. at 113; Judgment of May 6, 1931 (Zhu Gengfu v. Zhuang Ruozhou),
Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal Case No. 183, id. at 139; Judgment of Mar. 5, 1931
(Eleven Chinese bank managers v. He Gengxing), Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal
Case No. 10, id. at 175.
278. See Judgment of Mar. 23, 1931 (Wang Zhilun (banker) v. Yang Changjin), Special
District Court, Criminal Case No. 165, id. at 179; Judgment of June 30, 1930 (Tu Shizhu v.
Merchant Fang Ting), Shanghai Special District Court, Criminal Case No. 105, id. at 257.
279. See ANNUAL MIRROR OF SHANGHAI, supra note 22, Judicial section at 52-53, 112-13.
280. See Judgment of July 11, 1931 _(Guo Zhuqiao, Director of the China Commercial
Savings Bank v. Jiang Junsun), Shanghai District Court, JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 17;
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4. GUILD RESPONSE AS AN INDICATION OF COURT IMPACT ON
THE LOCAL MARKETPLACE
The presence of contract-enforcing courts offered an alternative
to collusive networks. Although centuries of cultural conditioning to
shun the courtroom did not disappear overnight, by the 1880s, the
outcasts and opportunists in Shanghai began taking advantage of new
legal opportunities. This option provided the pinprick sufficient to
burst the guilds' monopoly "bubble" on pricing, market entry, and
capital raising. Between 1905 and 1910, the civil courts made them-
selves attractive to plaintiffs. The courts' usefulness became known
through daily newspaper coverage and word of mouth, making their
use appealing even to the less daring. Collusive arrangements had by
then weakened to the point of capitulation or adaptation to a more
competitive marketplace. Capitulation was signalled by a deal struck
in 1911 between the largest civil court in town, the International
Mixed Court, and the new guild umbrella organization, the Chinese
General Chamber of Commerce. Once the collusive arrangements
had to some degree disintegrated and mutated, courts were available
to fill the void in dispute resolution formerly filled by the guilds.
Then, between 1927 and 1933, civil courts further lowered the cost of
litigation to Chinese merchants by replacing foreign judges with Chi-
nese judges, and rates of civil litigation soared until the Japanese
invaders disrupted the courts' operation and ended the experiment.
From their inception, the courts posed a threat to Shanghai's
traditional Chinese merchant networks. The presence of the powerful
courts with discretion to adjudicate financial cases lowered the cost
and risk of raising capital. License and debt cases came to comprise
approximately seventy percent of the total caseload of the Interna-
tional Mixed Court. Regardless of the number of disputes that never
reached a courtroom, having the courts available as bargain enforcers
transformed merchants' strategies for structuring deals.
Courts also affected the way capital, a key feature of market par-
ticipation, was raised. Outside collusive networks, speculation in land
allowed capital to be accumulated. Land played a pivotal role in capi-
tal raising in Shanghai, and the International and French Mixed
Courts' ability to enforce speculators' deals and determine eminent
domain questions made raising capital outside the guilds possible.
One of the strongest attestations of the courts' success in opening
the marketplace was guild mutation. The combination of the capital
Judgment of July 21, 1931 (appeal by merchant Ma Lizhou), Shanghai Special District Court,




raising function of land and the presence of adversarial courts, it
seems, forced the guild world to organize on a larger scale. Guilds
had always performed financial functions-many of the guilds had
begun as lending associations.2 81 In the first decade of the twentieth
century, however, as guilds in Shanghai grew, sectors of the Chinese
economy, organized cellularly as they had been in traditional China,
relinquished control of some of their affairs in Shanghai to an
umbrella organization, the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce.
Bankers comprised the leadership of this organization,282 and the
higher level of organization reflected the critical function of capital
raising in the Shanghai business world and the need for guilds to pool
their resources in order to compete in the business of raising capital.
The mutation also allowed the guilds to fashion a cooperative
relationship with the International Mixed Court, through which it
sought to minimize the loss of guild leverage in the marketplace. The
Chinese General Chamber of Commerce acted as speaker for the Chi-
nese business community in matters before the International Mixed
Court. In 1911, the predecessor to the Chinese General Chamber of
Commerce struck a deal with the Mixed Court, assenting to Mixed
Court jurisdiction over Chinese commercial dispute resolution, pre-
sumably in return for a promise either to expedite Chinese General
Chamber of Commerce claims at the Mixed Court, or to give the
Chamber the authority to punish its own members convicted at the
Mixed Court, or both.28 3
At the same time, some guilds developed separate relationships
with the International Mixed Court, marked by cooperation and
efforts to achieve mutual benefits. Guilds began to serve as aids to the
International Mixed Court and as intermediaries in merchant disputes
at the court. 284 They hired lawyers on an annual retainer to advise
members on how to avoid lawsuits. 2 5 Guilds were occasionally sued,
however, and they pooled their extensive monetary resources to hire
the best defense attorneys to improve their members' chance of win-
281. JERNIGAN, supra note 34, at 242.
282. Sanford, supra note 28, at 262-84.
283. Untitled Essay by Zhao Shi'en, delegate of Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce,
to the foreign diplomatic corps in Beijing in 1924, Falupinglun, no. 24, 2-3 (June 22, 1924).
284. The General Chamber of Commerce acted as a funnel for distributing settlement
payments to foreigners who brought debt suits against its members in the Mixed Court. See
FO, supra note 50, 656/111, May 16, 1906 (letter from Dickeson, Jones & Co. to British
judge). See also id., 656/123, May 1910 (petition from creditors in Hong Kong of the firm
Chun Shing Cheong) (describing how Court handed to the Chamber of Commerce for
distribution to creditors the $20,000 of securities found on the defendant).
285. Interview with Jiang Bingfan, Legal Counsel to the Shanghai Goldsmith Guild in the
1940s, in Shanghai (May 7, 1991).
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ning. They also came to the courts as third parties, either as creditors
or as guarantors of members involved in disputes with Chinese
outside the guild.286 For example, when a rice shop went bankrupt,
other rice shops joined the group of creditors petitioning the Mixed
Court for a share of the assets.287 Native banks, such as the Ningbo
Commercial Bank, petitioned the court as creditors of bankrupt Chi-
nese shops and factories. The Bankers Guild was itself a party in
these court actions.28 8 When members of Shanghai's various types of
guilds and merchant organizations sued and were sued, invoking the
aid of the courts as individuals, 289 guilds came to their assistance.
The partial breakdown of collusive trade networks in Shanghai
presumably made it more difficult for guilds to enforce their own rules
on members. However, the guilds adjusted to the court system to
such an extent that they learned to use it against their own members,
sometimes to enforce guild rules.29 On one occasion, the printed cot-
ton guild sued a member for mortgaging guild land without permis-
sion.29 1 Another time, the Anhui native place association accused its
loan officer of intentionally misappropriating a hefty portion of the
association's funds for his personal use.292
286. See, e.g., FO, supra note 50, 656/124, Aug. 17, 1910 (letter from Silk Guild's attorney
to British judge regarding a case of stolen silk cocoons); id. 656/124, Sept. 28, 1910 (letter
accompanying a guarantee from the Silk Guild to the Mixed Court and petition for probate
and rightful title suit); id. 656/124, Sept. 23, 1910 (letter from Silk Guild's attorney to British
judge accompanying a guarantee and petition for probate and land transfer suit).
287. Gongtang fafeng midian, [Mixed Court issues orders to close rice shop], SHENBAO
(China), Dec. 11, 1914.
288. See, e.g., FO, supra note 50, 656/131, Dec. 10, 1912 (letter to Mixed Court Registrar
from M. Hughes, regarding Chao Kong Bank's deposit in Hongkong & Shanghai Bank); id.
656/164, Feb. 28, 1921 (letter from White-Cooper, Master & Harris to British judge, regarding
Tsing Teh Native Bank v. Sing Tai Yah Hong and Dzang Tse Tsung).
289. A member of the Native Banker's Guild in Shanghai, representing ten Chinese banks,
brought a foreclosure suit against three Chinese businesses. The businesses had purchased a
series of equitable mortgages from him on fourteen tracts of land in the International
Settlement and the French Concession. The amount of the defaulted mortgage payments was
531,911 taels, excluding the value of rents collectable on the property. FO, supra note 50, 656/
131, Feb. 4, 1913 (petition of Chen Yih Tsai against Yuen Woo, Yah Hsing, and Loong
Sheng).
290. A contemporary observer reported that Shanghai had about 150 guilds and 500
members in the Zongshanghui. He noted that the guilds had difficulty enforcing their own
rules on members. He also maintained that, though these bodies settled "the great majority of
disputes in a Chinese mercantile community," they had no means for enforcing decisions
without both parties' consent. In the absence of cooperation, these bodies sent the cases to
court to retry the case and enforce the judgment. The court's judgement tended to favor the
complainant or plaintiff. ARNOLD, supra note 26, at 195, 245-47, 250-51.
291. Simai hechan zhi chansong [private sellers of joint property embroiled in lawsuit],
SHENBAO (China), Mar. 14, 1914.
292. Judgment of July 30, 1931 (prosecution of Zhu Yuzhi for misappropriating 12,928.95
yuan), Special District Court, Criminal Case No. 194, JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 49.
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The cooperative relationship forged by the guilds with the Inter-
national Mixed Court can best be explained as a pragmatic response
to the threat the court posed to organized commerce. The guilds, and
their more recent incarnations in the General Chamber of Commerce
and street merchants' associations, persistently supported a local Chi-
nese takeover of the court, and so would not likely have cooperated
with a foreign-run court unless their survival had depended on it.293
The guilds mutated to reduce the growing risks for guild members
after the guilds lost control over pricing in the city, a mutation which
immediately led to collaboration with the court. The proximity in
time of these two accommodations suggests a linkage of some sort, a
common motivation for both. Thus, the guilds collaboration was
capitulation to the court's power to reduce the risk and cost of com-
mercial transactions.
Despite some gain in guild leverage on a case-by-case basis in the
courts, guild involvement in litigation did not recoup all the leverage
guilds had lost. Guilds suffered from a natural handicap in the
courts. The procedural form of the lawsuit lent itself to the articula-
tion of individual rights. Groups such as guilds found the lawsuit a
limited vehicle for addressing their needs for justice.
The guilds, in recognition of the limitations of the lawsuit,
requested services from the International Mixed Court that extended
beyond the lawsuit. They retooled their organizational strengths and
employed longstanding public lobbying techniques to elicit from the
court advisory opinions that protected members from certain types of
293. Between 1922 and 1924, the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce was
instrumental in organizing Shanghai's guilds and merchant associations to press for transfer of
control away from the Mixed Court. In late 1922, the Chamber of Commerce drew up a plan
for reform of the court and sent it to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs for approval. The
Chamber of Commerce and eleven guilds and merchant associations publicly petitioned the
Consular Body to institute a revised version of the plan. They proposed six reforms that gave
Chinese more influence over the court's operation. At a banquet honoring the British
Ambassador to China, they urged the consuls present to make the requested changes at the
court. The Chamber of Commerce later repeated that plea in a letter to the Senior Consul. A
year later, the national government forwarded the proposal to the Diplomatic Body in Beijing.
Between 1922 and 1924 the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce sent dozens of letters
and telegrams to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs urging him to pressure the Shanghai
consuls into surrendering control over the Mixed Court's operations. See File 179.4.2, Qian
jiangsu jiaosheshu shouhui gongxie gexiang wenjian [documents on various aspects of the
former Jiangsu negotiations for the rendition of the International Mixed Court], at 1-41,
Shanghai Municipal Archives. In 1924, the General Chamber of Commerce and smaller
commercial organizations from Shanghai sent delegates to Beijing to pressure both the Chinese
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to arrange for Chinese control of the
Mixed Court. FALU PINGLUN [THE LAW CRITIC], no. 52, June 22, 1924, at 2. In 1927,
several guilds in Shanghai formed "Merchant Associations" (Shangmin xiehuO. Joseph
Fewsmith, The Shanghai Connection, in 11 MODERN CHINA No. 1, 128 (Jan. 1985).
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suits before disputes would have prompted merchants to sue.294 Rep-
resentatives of guilds asked the International Mixed Court's Chinese
judge to act as an intermediary between the Chinese business commu-
nity and the Municipal Council when problems arose in the enforce-
ment of Municipal Council executive orders. Organized segments of
the Chinese business community invoked the court's aid to stave off
an impending commercial crisis. In 1911, for example, the Council
ordered Chinese innkeepers to substitute iron bed-posts for the
wooden ones then in use and to carry out structural alterations to
their inns. One hundred and sixty innkeepers, unable to absorb the
cost of the alterations, petitioned the Mixed Court Magistrate to sug-
gest modified instructions to the Council.295 In another instance, the
goldsmith guild asked the International Mixed Court to follow local
Chinese custom in settling all disputes over goods bought at
pawnshops.296
The cooperative arrangement looked more like an effort by the
guilds to cut their losses under duress than a change welcomed by
them under any circumstances. While the courts, from their
responses to guild capitulation, appear to have lost little, they gained
much from guild recognition of court authority. The patterns of
cooperation between the International Mixed Court and the organ-
ized Chinese merchant community in Shanghai suggest that the court
acknowledged local business practices when doing so strengthened its
authority. The court's practice of detaining a civil defendant unless a
guarantor deposited a sum of money with the court was an example of
the court's adoption of local business custom. Used by merchants for
settling debts, the custom supplied the court with an inexpensive and
convenient means to ensure compliance with its judgments.
Another example of the upper hand gained by the court in its
alliance with the guilds was in the court's new authority to shape the
course of local business custom. Shanghai's development brought
high-rise buildings in the 1900s and automobiles in the 19 1Os, both of
which produced new kinds of disputes involving accidental and negli-
gent injury or death. In the first decade of this century, a spate of
Chinese child apprentices to construction workers fell to their deaths
during the erection of multi-storied office buildings along the now-
famous wharf promenade called "the Bund." The court's presence
and an eager local bar made tort a potential area of growth in the
294. The Gold- and Silversmiths and Pawnbrokers Guilds wrote to the Mixed Court asking
for a declaration of Guild members' immunity from criminal liability for selling stolen goods.
See MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, Apr. 30, 1914.
295. FO, supra note 50, 656/126, Sept. 11, 1911.
296. Id. 656/137, Jan. 25, 1915; id. 656/137, Feb. 17, 1915; id. 656/126, Mar. 3, 1911.
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local law, but one that would have looked undesirable to an already
overworked, pro-development court. In a move that surely discour-
aged tort actions against the construction community, the court's
senior Chinese judge asked the Chinese General Chamber of Com-
merce and the masons' and carpenters' guilds to codify new profes-
sional standards for construction jobs performed at great heights. In
response, three hundred members of two rival factions of those guilds
met and promptly issued a rule prohibiting workmen shorter than
four feet from performing construction work alone above ground
level.297
The International Mixed Court sent an average of twenty-one
convicts every month to guilds for execution of their judgments.298
Not even this practice is convincing evidence, however, that guilds
cooperating with the court recouped all the leverage they lost with the
introduction of contract-enforcing courts. First of all, the number of
convicts made up too small a portion of the total number of people
sentenced at the court-less than one percent-to be a significant del-
egation of court authority to guilds. Furthermore, the numbers do
not necessarily reflect the infrequency with which guild members
came before the court but, rather, could reflect the infrequency with
which the court delegated to guilds the task of executing the court's
judgments. Moreover, this delegation need not have included a trans-
ference of authority. Rather, the court may have exacted its own pen-
297. Id. 656/118, Mar. 20, 1909.
298.
TABLE VI - INTERNATIONAL MIXED COURT CONVICTS SENT TO
GUILDS FOR PUNISHMENT*
1913 8 (Mar., Apr., May, Dec. only)













*ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 70A-71A (1919); MUNICIPAL GAZETTE, May 1, 1913,
at 112-13; May 22, 1913, at 130; June 26, 1913, at 153; Jan. 22, 1914, at 17; Apr. 30, 1914, at
138-39; May 28, 1914, at 167-68; June 25, 1914, at 210-11; July 23, 1914, at 236-37; Sept. 3,
1914, at 259-60; Sept. 24, 1914, at 280-82; Oct. 29, 1914, at 304-05; Nov. 26, 1914, at 326-27;
Dec. 24, 1914, at 363-64; Feb. 4, 1915, at 32-33.
**Data taken from ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 64 (1929).
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alty from these defendants, such as compensation to the plaintiff or
complainant, before sending them to the guilds. The judgment of the
court in these cases was always called a "punishment," indicating
either that these cases were all criminal,299 or that the guilds were
suing their own members for breaking guild rules. Either way, the
court would have retained discretion over the execution of judgments
against guild members sued by non-guild members.
The guilds' grip on price controls presumably loosened as profes-
sions outside of the guild structure emerged. Divisions between the
guilds and non-guild professional groups of Chinese became more
pronounced, and the divisions revealed a loosening of guild control
over capital accumulation. "Compradores," a new type of broker,
were one class of Chinese who grew wealthy outside the bounds of
guild restrictions.
Courts played a role in the rise of brokers free of guild control.
Compradores frequently filed lawsuits at the International Mixed
Court, some on behalf of their foreign bosses, some on their own.
3
0
Chinese lawyers also amassed wealth outside the guild structure func-
tioning much like the compradores, as brokers and middlemen.
Some sinologists refer to the rise of these brokers as "compradore
capitalism,"'30 1 the implication being that the growth of this class of
middleman was either simply one of many forms of capitalism operat-
ing in Shanghai at the time, or merely a strange breed of capitalism
particular to the city. The rise of these middlemen represented some-
299. See JIANGSU, supra note 45, at 19.
300. See, e.g., FO, supra note 50, 656/118, Oct. 27, 1909 (letter from W.T. Garnett & Co. to
British judge, regarding the case of Yang Tsin Zung v. Nye Tah Cheong); id. 656/118, July 19
and 23, 1909 (letters from Platt, Teesdale & MacLeod to British judge, regarding the case of
Ma Liang Kung v. Shar Yin Chay); id. 656/126, June 12, 1912 (letter from British judge to
Mixed Court Registrar); id. 656/132, Jan. 19, 1916 (letter from Police Commissioner McKuen
to British judge); id. 656/110, Mar. 19, 1906 (letter from British judge to compradore's British
attorneys).
301. Eg., Lucian Pye, Chinese Nationalism and Modernization, Presentation at the
Fairbank Center, Harvard University, Mar. 7, 1991. Chinese other than compradores, who
did not enjoy foreign support but may have benefitted from Chinese government backing,
found themselves at a disadvantage against merchants with foreign ties, euphemistically
known as the guanliaoshiban. They were simply unable to compete with the foreigners.
Chinese historians and writers on the mainland have depicted this split as an intended "divide-
and-conquer" strategy of foreign businesses and governments in early twentieth century
Shanghai. The land-investment patterns put indigenous Chinese investment and entrepreneurs
at a particular disadvantage. Interview with historian Yu Xingzhong, East Asian Legal
Studies Center of Harvard University (Feb. 28, 1991). See also MAO DUN, MIDNIGHT
(Foreign Languages Press, 2d ed., 1979) (illustrating this phenomenon in a work of fiction).
JIU ZHONGGUO DE ZIBENZHUYI SHENGCHAN GUANXI (Renmin chubanshe, 1976), at 1-20;
ZHONGGUO JINDAI GONGYE SHI ZILIAO (Zhonghua shuju, Wang Jingyu and Sun Yutang,
comps.), vol. 1, at 957-1173; vol. 2, at 1019-20.
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thing far more significant, however. The growth of the compradores'
incomes and their role in commercial transactions spelled the growth
of capital outside the guild structure, and their services offered a via-
ble alternative to guild arrangements. By offering alternatives to guild
arrangements and guild capital, the compradore was a vehicle for the
very competitive market conditions that make capitalism possible.
The split between the guilds and the new kinds of professionals
manifested itself in the public positions the two sides took toward the
International Mixed Court. When it appeared that the court might
transfer its power to Chinese control, the organized Chinese merchant
community espoused a vision of the court's structure different from
that of local lawyers, a group that grew wealthy outside the guild
structure. Both groups wanted to play a dominant role in running the
new court, but each differed over the desirability of national supervi-
sion. Merchants wanted to gain influence over the court's decision-
making, while allowing the Municipal Police to continue enforcing
the court's decisions. Merchants also wanted to keep the court's
Anglo-American-Chinese structure largely intact, and tried to pre-
serve its local control. Local control of the court would have facili-
tated the merchants' bid for decisionmaking power there, particularly
their proposal to elect its judges from their own ranks. The
merchants also sought to add a jury of local residents, which was con-
sidered an unpatriotic desire because it went beyond preserving to
actually strengthening the Anglo-American nature of the court. The
group also wanted the Ministry of Justice, responsible for appointing
the new judges to the court, to select people very familiar with local
customs and well-known in the community-in other words, Shang-
hai residents. The merchants explicitly requested of the Shanghai
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs that he act to preserve the indepen-
dence of the court after its reorganization. °2
In contrast, the local Chinese lawyers who practiced before the
International Mixed Court wanted the court to be integrated into the
growing national court system. The Shanghai Bar Association envi-
sioned a court system following the basically Anglo-American civil
procedure already in use at the court, which allowed lawyers to repre-
sent both civil plaintiffs and defendants.30 3 In 1923, when it became
clear that the Chinese Shanghai Bar Association was leagued with the
302. Communique from the Shanghai gelu shangjie zonglianhehui [United Street
Merchants Association] to Shanghai jiaoshe shixu [Shanghai Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs] 87-89 (Aug. 10, 1926), File 179.4.4, Shanghai Municipal Archives.
303. Faquan taolun weiyuanhui shanghai gongong huishengongxie shicha baogao, FALU
ZHOUKAN, no. 10, Sept. 9, 1923, at 19-20.
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national Ministry of Justice, 3" provincial authorities put the Bar
Association in charge of negotiating on behalf of the Chinese govern-
ment.30 5 The lawyers wanted decisionmaking power passed to nation-
ally appointed officials, 306 posts coveted by ambitious law students,
local judges and prosecutors.
B. Courts and Culture
In Shanghai, courts that favored plaintiffs and enforced contracts
shaped the local economy in an environment unfamiliar with and
inhospitable to litigation. This observation is not evidence of the
insignificance of the cultural environment; the lack of indigenous
experience with contract-enforcing courts may have slowed their rise
in Shanghai. Far from being insignificant to the development of the
courts, the cultural environment stood in complex relation to them.
Looking at the cultural environment is crucial to understanding not
just the development of the courts, but also the effect of the courts on
the local economy. Thus, the lessons of the Shanghai experience may
only be completely grasped by factoring culture into the court-mar-
ketplace equation.
The twin concepts of rationality and expectations, both central to
law and economic processes, are highly susceptible to cultural condi-
tioning. An individual's context-rooted experience forms his expecta-
tions of both justice and future profits. Such experience also defines
how a "reasonable person" behaves in a dispute-producing crisis and
what is rational behavior in reaching agreements in the marketplace.
In this way, the experience with economic transactions of Chinese
judges and litigants in Shanghai courts differed from that of the for-
eign judges and litigants.
Courts helped change not only the local economy, but also the
economic culture. As if to cement and perpetuate the opening of the
marketplace, courts also altered culturally-embedded definitions of
304. Cifabu duiyu shanghai zufie huishengongtang diaocha baogao shu [Report on the
Examination by the Ministry of Justice of the Shanghai International Settlement Mixed Court],
FALU ZHOUKAN, no. 12, Sept. 23, 1923, at 16-18.
305. Communique from Zheng Yipeng, President of the Shanghai Bar Association, to the
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs Hsu, at 66-67 (July 15, 1923), File 179.4.4, Shanghai
Municipal Archives.
306. You Xiaoquan, Gongxie yuequan shouli zhi zeyan [Acting Without Authorization,
International Mixed Court Receives Reprimand], FALU ZHOUKAN, no. 9, Sept. 2, 1923, at 32-
33. See also Cai Xiuzuan, Faquan taolun [Report on the Examination of the Shanghai
International Mixed Court by the Legal Rights Council], FALU ZHOUKAN, no. 11, Sept. 16,
1923, at 19-20; id. no. 12, Sept. 23, 1923, at 18-20; id. no. 13, Sept. 30, 1923, at 35-38; Chao
Kun, Shanghai huishengongtang biji [notes on the Shanghai International Mixed Court], FALU
ZHOUKAN, no. 12, Sept. 23, 1923, at 30-35.
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what was rational in the expectations of profit and in the resolution of
commercial disputes. As Shanghai residents took advantage of the
new opportunity to enforce agreements in court, their attitudes about
the marketplace and dispute resolution changed. This phenomenon
should not surprise us. After all, law is not wholly the product of
culture, as not all legal development arises indigenously.30 7
Culture in Shanghai at the turn of the century evolved in an eco-
nomic and legal context different from ours. Contract enforcement by
legal institutions was new to China. Before the opening of Shanghai,
as far as we know, law was not used in China as a tool for economic
growth. More specifically, legal institutions were not a dependable
means to achieve personal economic enrichment or compensation for
the breakdown of business relationships. China lacked a tradition of
investing discretion in courts of first instance over the disposition of
merchant assets. Courts in China were removed from most people's
lives, and not easily accessible to the public for resolution of commer-
cial matters. Law was not a local affair, and national law touched
people's lives only if they committed a violent, anti-social act that
came to the attention of the jurisdiction's sometimes distant District
Magistrate, an official presiding perhaps several days' journey
away.308 China's last imperial rulers enacted virtually no laws regu-
lating commercial activities or land ownership, and issued edicts
expressing their disapproval of people taking their disputes to
court. 30 9 An absence of statutory law combined with official disap-
proval of litigation and punishment of those who were deemed to
307. Alan Watson has unearthed extensive evidence of this. See generally ALAN WATSON,
LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974); ALAN WATSON, THE NATURE OF LAW (1977); ALAN
WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE (1977); ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL
CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY (1984).
308. Systematic research gauging the reach of central government law in imperial China
has yet to be undertaken. Work on the Chinese imperial bureaucracy and its functioning at
the district or local level so far suggests a shallow penetration of government into society. See
CHANG WEJEN, QING DAI FACHI YANJIA [RESEARCH ON THE QING LEGAL SYSTEM] (3 vols.
1983); CH'U T'UNG-TZU, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH'ING 1-18, 116-29
(Harvard University Press, 4th printing, 1988); JONATHAN OCKO, BUREAUCRATIC REFORM
IN PROVINCIAL CHINA: JIANGSU PROVINCE, 1867-1870 (1982); JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE
DEATH OF WOMAN WANG (1979); G.W. Skinner, Marketing and Social Structure in Rural
China, 24 J. OF ASIAN STUD. 7 (Nov. 1964); see also THOMAS METZGER, THE INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION OF THE CH'ING BUREAUCRACY: LEGAL, NORMATIVE AND
COMMUNICATION ASPECTS (1973); JAMES WATT, THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE IN LATE
IMPERIAL CHINA (1972); Chen Fu-mei, Local Control of Convicted Thieves, in CONFLICT AND
CONTROL IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (Frederic Wakeman, Jr., ed. 1975).
309. For a discussion of the few exceptions to this, see Sanford, supra note 28, at 98; James
Feinerman, The Dian Transaction (unpublished paper delivered at the American Society for
Legal History annual conference, Atlanta, Feb. 10, 1990); William Jones, Economic
Regulation in the Qing Code (unpublished paper delivered at the American Society for Legal
History annual conference, Atlanta, Feb. 10, 1990).
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have brought "frivolous" lawsuits all contributed to the view that
China had a cultural aversion to litigation. Chinese and Western
observers consequently have agreed that China was, and still is, an
anti-litigious culture. l°
Chinese merchants, steeped in the collusive economic culture
and predominantly penal legal culture prevailing in China before the
mid-nineteenth century, were not used to weighing the costs of litigat-
ing against the benefits of reducing risk that litigation afforded. Not
all Shanghainese in the early years of this century even understood
the difference between civil and criminal court processes. For exam-
ple, in 1909, a Mr. Wong lent a Mr. Dian $360 to set up a business as
a timber merchant. The two later met in Shanghai and Mr. Wong
asked Mr. Dian to repay the loan. When Mr. Dian refused, Mr.
Wong took him to the Municipal Police station in the Hankou district
police informed him that the case was a civil matter and that he
should file a petition with the Mixed Court. Instead, the two
merchants went to a teashop to settle their differences themselves.
There, they got into a fight, and this time Mr. Dian took Mr. Wong to
the police station to have him prosecuted for robbery. The police sub-
sequently prosecuted both of them for disturbing the peace.3 I
Fully "rational" in the context of their cultural experience, Mr.
Wong and Mr. Dian followed an all-or-nothing approach. Their first
response to a breakdown in a commercial agreement was to settle the
disagreement without resorting to litigation, but instead trying to
negotiate in the favorite Chinese watering hole, the neighborhood tea-
room. Methods of cooperation governed their strategic behavior until
late in the negotiation process. Mr. Wong and Mr. Dian either did
not understand or did not care that suing in the Mixed Court was
cheaper for the plaintiff than for the defendant, or that suing reduced
the risk of losing money on their loan arrangement. Neither consid-
ered that civil litigation might be financially more rewarding than
revenge by criminal prosecution. Their story also shows a propensity
to invoke the strong arm of the law-police and criminal sanctions-
when settlement proved impossible and passions flared. Profitmaking
310. See, e.g., VICTOR H. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS 19-20 (1978); SYBILLE
VANDERSPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA 112-30, 135-36 (1962);
Benjamin Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND
THE INDIVIDUAL 28-39 (1957); Zhou Zheng, China's System of Community Mediation,
BEIJING REV., Nov. 23, 1981. See also Stanley B. Lubman, Emerging Functions of Formal
Legal Institutions in China's Modernization, in CHINA UNDER THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS
237-40 (Dec. 30, 1982); Stanley B. Lubman, A Legal Opinion, CHINA TRADE REPORT 7 (Sept.
1989).
311. FO, supra note 50, 656/118, 1909.
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beyond the breakdown of the business relationship was not part of
rational behavior in their economic culture.
We have seen how the Shanghai courts reduced the cost of litiga-
tion in the 1900s and 1910s. The civil-criminal distinction alone cre-
ated a courtroom solution to disputes that was relatively free from the
stigma Chinese associated with the criminal process. Cost reduction,
however, does not fully explain Shanghai's reception of the lawsuit.
Litigation makes sense only if merchants expect to profit beyond the
breakdown of the business relationship. Nearly a century of litigation
instilled this expectation in the Shanghai business community. As an
initial step in this fundamental change, the introduction of contract-
enforcing lawsuits allowed strategic planning to extend beyond the
breakdown of the business relationship. Once possible, it made sense.
Once sensible, it factored into business calculations.
By "sensible," one could mean "rational," and so one could con-
sider this change in expectations to have changed what was "rational"
in the marketplace. The enforcement power that courts gave to indi-
viduals independent of collusive networks reduced the importance to
economic survival of preserving business relationships. When cooper-
ative, long-term relationships ceased to be a necessary for profitmak-
ing, bargains with strangers became rational.
In this light, the courtroom was the classroom, not just for litiga-
tion techniques, but also for business strategy. Cheaper and more
plentiful opportunities to litigate taught Chinese merchants to shift
their strategic planning away from forming and maintaining relation-
ships and toward maximizing profits in the event of a breakdown. As
thousands passed through the courts, they learned that the distinction
between civil and criminal allowed commercial enrichment outside
the cooperative business relationship. Thus, litigation created a new
horizon for profitmaking and a new horizon for competition. While
not causing merchants to abandon efforts to create and maintain busi-
ness relationships, this new way of thinking about profitmaking
opportunities made the breakdown of a deal something to contem-
plate in advance of the relationship's formation, before passion led to
abandoning the quest for compensation. By incorporating the court-
room option into their business calculations, Chinese merchants' con-
cerns about profitmaking extended farther along the time horizon of
any business relationship, and merchants became more competitive in
the negotiating process before disputes arose.
This teaching process extended beyond the courtroom. Civil
lawsuits captured the imagination of the Chinese public. Measured
by the relative frequency of the types of cases reported in Shanghai's
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largest circulating Chinese newspaper, the Chinese population was
more interested in debt cases than in theft and robbery prosecutions,
with all their human melodrama.
TABLE VII - CASE TYPES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
REPORTED CASES
3 12
Jan. -June 1914 July-Dec. 1914
Debt 21.8% 17.6%










Lawyers did their part to encourage Chinese to litigate. British
and American attorneys advertised the range of their services in local
Chinese newspapers and opened Shanghai's first law school. When
young Chinese noticed the handsome income made by local lawyers
in private practice, they enrolled in law schools and opened others of
their own. On the initiative of these energetic and creative legal pro-
fessionals, popular legal publications flourished.3 13 Lawyers made
themselves indispensable to the conduct of business in all stages of the
business relationship. As negotiators of contracts and land transfers,
lawyers assumed the traditionally crucial position of broker in Chi-
nese commerce, and thus became necessary to the formation of busi-
ness relationships. As counsellors on retainer, lawyers assumed the
traditional mediation functions of the village elder or dibao, advising
their clients on how to avoid disputes. As litigators, lawyers assumed
the traditional position of political power broker with an entre to gov-
ernment officials with decisionmaking authority over disputes, from
the District Magistrate up to the Emperor. The access lawyers had to
judges through the regular course of their duties made lawyers indis-
pensable in early twentieth century Shanghai to convincing judges to
312. See Daily Reports of court sessions, SHENBAO (Jan.-Dec. 1914).
313. Among the most prominent publications were FALU JIKAN [LAW QUARTERLY],
FALU PINGLUN [THE LAW CRITIC], FALU ZHOUKAN [LAW WEEKLY], FALU CONGKAN




order the salvaging of profits after the breakdown of the business
transaction.
That contract enforcing courts took root in Shanghai does not by
itself prove that the option to enforce contracts provided by courts is
essential to opening markets everywhere and in every age. Of course,
transactions between strangers are possible without courts, if the
strangers use hostages or other devices for guaranteeing profit
upfront. But these forms are imperfect at eradicating both the need
for some relationship and the possibility of breakdown of that rela-
tionship. 314 Nor can these devices carry with them the means for cul-
tural transformation that courts can; rather, these devices presuppose
an economic culture already deemphasizing longterm business rela-
tionships. Thus, it is the change in economic culture fostered by
courts that is a necessary part of the process of opening up any mar-
ketplace. Strategic and competitive behavior of market participants is
a prerequisite to freer markets, and the presence of the new courts
encouraged such behavior in Shanghai. Courts gave the Chinese liv-
ing in Shanghai a forum for practicing and adjusting to strategic
behavior. It is plausible that contract-enforcing courts can make
themselves attractive in any cultural context. Structural incentives to
litigate built into the courts were capable of inducing Chinese to use
the courts despite the double stigma that, in their view, attached to
the courts: the ancient stigma associated with all courts, as fostered
by centuries of harsh yet distant experience with them; and the
ancient stigma associated with any institution run by foreigners. The
structural incentives overrode both disincentives, but only once
merchants understood what a civil court process could do within the
context of a business relationship.
Once we take into account the change in the way Shanghai
merchants arrived at their business calculations, we confront the
issues of cultural determinism and litigiousness. This study presents
evidence that calls into question the proposition that anti-litigiousness
is a timeless characteristic of Chinese legal culture. If Chinese
merchants in late nineteenth century Shanghai were initially anti-litig-
ious, the courts of Shanghai provide us with a case study of the cir-
cumstances in which merchants learn to use courts, and of the degree
to which economics can override culture to encourage litigiousness.
The figures in this study suggest a trend in Shanghai before the com-
munist revolution toward courtroom adjudication of commercial dis-
putes. True, litigiousness-the tendency to take disputes to court-
may not have grown in republican-era Shanghai if the total number of
314. See Kronman, supra note 2.
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disputes grew faster than the court caseload. It is impossible, how-
ever, to gather data on the total number of disputes in Shanghai. This
study shows, at a minimum, however, that new economic opportuni-
ties in Shanghai in the first decades of the twentieth century overrode,
at least for some Chinese, whatever cultural distaste for litigation had
previously kept them out of court. We can see that a preference for
informal modes of dispute resolution, such as those within the family,
village, or business organization, is not influenced by something we
call "culture" as much as it is culture. Such preferences form legal
culture. Legal culture is not immutable, but in fact is quite vulnerable
to economic pressures. Dispute resolution preferences are condi-
tioned by the advantages afforded to plaintiffs by the courts, and in
Shanghai, a new set of economic opportunities created these
advantages.
A second lesson of the Shanghai experience is that economics can
override legal culture. In other words, legal culture can grow to
accommodate economic opportunities. Definitions of rational behav-
ior change to fit the prevailing economic system. The story of Shang-
hai in the century before 1949 demonstrates that courts are one of the
mechanisms that reshape definitions of rational behavior to fit the
open marketplace.
V. CONCLUSION
In mid-nineteenth century Shanghai, courts helped foreign
merchants to open the China market. Despite centuries of cultural
conditioning to shun competition and fear the courtroom, Chinese
merchants took advantage of the new bargaining power offered by the
courts to strive for profits even after the breakdown of their business
relationships. Courts helped the merchants succeed outside collusive
networks, escape those networks, and enhance the predictability of
their non-collusive business relationships by settling commercial dis-
putes more definitely and quickly than was otherwise possible.
Because of the courts' ability to enforce their decisions, their pro-
plaintiff slant, and their accessibility to all actors for all kinds of dis-
putes, the courts offered Chinese merchants powerful incentives for
bringing their disputes to court. By providing an alternative to guilds
for enforcing agreements, the mixed courts challenged the collusive
control of guilds over prices and market entry. Courts aided the
transformation of the marketplace by drawing law and economics
together more closely than ever before in China. Statutory law and
policy proclaimed in executive decrees and bureaucratic orders could
not have had the immediate and widespread impact on the local econ-
1412
COURTS OF SHANGHAI
omy that the enforcement of the approximately six million local court
cases did.
Moreover, these courts exerted an impact on law itself. From
1905 to 1949, a host of new Chinese courts incorporated some varia-
tion of the mixed court model into the Chinese court system.
Although the Chinese rejected the mixed nationality of the bench of
the mixed courts, other fundamental aspects of the mixed courts,
namely their procedure, territorial jurisdiction, subject matter juris-
diction, and methods of enforcement, became important characteris-
tics of the new Chinese courts in Shanghai.
From this story emerge two general principles of the relationship
between courts and markets. First, contract-enforcing courts can
quickly come into being and affect the economy even in locations
unused to the interaction of court and marketplace. Courts can sus-
tain their own growth and their role in the economy by structuring
themselves to attract litigation, principally by offering incentives to
plaintiffs. Incentives may include inexpensive and easy-to-use proce-
dures for filing petitions, outcomes that are known to favor plaintiffs,
a high probability of enforcement of court orders and judgments, a
subject matter jurisdiction encompassing a wide variety of commer-
cial disputes, and the opportunity of direct access to the judge
through the hiring of professional counsel.
Second, the story suggests that courts can open markets in four
ways. For one, courts that enforce contracts can reduce risk inherent
in property transactions by settling questions of control. If property
ownership is closely linked to raising capital-a barrier to market
entry-then courts that resolve questions of property control lower
the cost of raising capital and thus lower a barrier to market entry.
As a second way to open markets in a collusive local marketplace,
courts in criminal cases lower barriers to market entry if they enforce
government regulations, such as licensing requirements that require
only a small monetary fee in order to enter the market. Third, courts
that enforce private deals lower barriers to market entry by lowering
the transaction cost of contract enforcement for merchants outside
collusive networks. Fourth and finally, courts willing to enforce pri-
vate, non-collective bargains promote the culture needed for open
markets, a culture based on individual claims to rights, competition,
and strategic calculation of enrichment beyond the breakdown of the
business relationship. By hearing commercial quarrels in the dyadic
form of a lawsuit, courts remold definitions of rational economic
behavior to value the autonomy of individuals and the assertion of
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individual rights, both fundamental assumptions of open markets in
the western experience.
